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Note
The Best Interests of Children in the

Cultural Context of the
Indian Child Welfare Act in In re S.S. and R.S.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The life of man is a circle from childhood to childhood, and so
it is in everything where power moves. Our teepees were round
like the nests of birds, and these were always set in a circle, the
nation's hoop, a nest of many nests, where the Great Spirit
meant for us to hatch our children.'
This Native American2 children's poem indicates a philosophy of
community shared by Native American tribes that is expressed in their
social culture, particularly in the familial context. Native American
culture differs in several ways from the predominant American culture
of Judeo-Christian values. Because families and children comprise a
fundamental building block of any society, two cultures may find
themselves at odds when forced to interact or coexist on the domestic
level .4

The Native Americans tribal culture and the predominant American
culture meet head-to-head in familial legal struggles. One such conflict
was at issue in the Illinois Supreme Court decision in In re Adoption
of S.S. and R.S.5 In In re S.S., the Illinois Supreme Court sought to
resolve the jurisdictional issue of whether the Native American tribal
court or the state court provided the proper forum for a decision
regarding the termination of parental rights of a Native American

1. John G. Neihardt, The Life of a Man Is a Circle, in BLACK ELK SPEAKS (Simon &
Schuster Pocket Books and the University of Nebraska Press 1961) (1932), reprinted in
VIRGINIA DRIVING HAWK SNEVE, DANCING TEEPEES 8 (Holiday House 1989).
2. The terms "Native American" and "Indian" will be used interchangeably throughout
this Note in order to maintain continuity with statutory language and the language of
various authors and judges.
3. B.J. JONES, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK 6 (1995); Donna J.
Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare Act, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 7-10 (1990).
4. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 7-10.
5. In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1320 (1996).

839

840

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

woman and the subsequent adoption of her Native American children.6
The Native American woman and her tribe contended that the state
court was without jurisdiction to hear the termination and adoption
proceedings.' Although Congress, under the Indian Child Welfare
Act,8 conferred exclusive jurisdiction to tribal courts over "any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe," 9 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the children were not necessarily domiciliaries of the
tribe.'0 The Court circuitously rejected the tribe's claim of exclusive
jurisdiction over the proceedings and distinguished it from United
States Supreme Court precedent."1
This Note first summarizes the history, development, and enactment
of federal legislation known as the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
("ICWA" or "the Act"), along with the United States Supreme Court
interpretation of that legislation, to demonstrate the context in which
the Illinois Supreme Court decided In re S.S.' 2 This Note then
discusses the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in In re
S.S.' 3 Next, this Note criticizes the majority and concurring decisions
of In re S.S. for their contrived attempt to distinguish United States
Supreme Court precedent and for their direct contravention of
congressional intent.' 4 Finally, this Note predicts that the In re S.S.
holding will result in confusion and inefficiency when future ICWA
issues arise in Illinois courts. 5
II. BACKGROUND
A. Tribal Community
Although the particular customs and practices of Native Americans
vary from tribe to tribe, there are some general cultural traditions
which are common to most tribes.' 6 "Continuing tribal traditions
result in a world view and a concept of group identity which create a
6.
7.

Id. at 937.
Id. at 938-39.

8. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
9. Id. § 1911(a).
10. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 943.
11. Id. at 941. The court distinguished the case from Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. JONES, supra note 3, at 5.
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culture within a culture, the values of which generally are unknown,
unnoticed, or unrecognized by those who are unacquainted with tribal
customs.' 7 The premise of Native American culture and mores is the
individual existence is dependent upon the survival of the
concept that
"whole."' 8 Native American tribes pass this "holistic thinking" from
generation to generation both through tribal social structure and the
tradition of oral storytelling. 9
An essential component of this holistic tribal culture is that Native
American children traditionally are raised not only within the context of
their immediate family, but also within the context of the larger tribe.20
Grandparents, great-aunts or great-uncles, aunts or uncles, or cousins
frequently raised children not because of the neglect or inability of the
children's parents, but because of familial obligation to the extended
family. 2 ' Tribal members with child rearing responsibilities direct their
efforts not only toward their biological children, but also toward all
tribal children.22 Consequently, many Native Americans identify
themselves as "part of the larger cultural group, not as completely
autonomous individuals., 23 Federal law acknowledged the emphasis
that Native Americans place on tribal identity by providing for an
in the welfare of Native American children
independent tribal interest
24
in adoption proceedings.
17. Edward L. Thompson, Protecting Abused Children: A Judge's Perspective on
Public Law, Deprived Child Proceedingsand the Impact of the Indian Child Welfare Acts,
15 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (quoting In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d
1059, 1074 (Okla. 1985) (Kauger, J,, concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
18. JONES, supra note 3, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 6. A noteworthy example of this cultural and historical phenomenon is
reflected in the widely spoken Choctaw language in which the words for "mother" and
"father" are also used to refer to the father's sisters and mother's brothers respectively,
as well as to other relatives. Proposed Bill to Amend the Indian Child Welfare Act:
Hearings on S. 1448 before the Subcomm. On Native American and Insular Affairs of the
House Resources Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement on behalf of the Association
on American Indian Affairs, Inc., by Jack F. Trope, Counsel to the Association on
American Indian Affairs, Inc.) (citing John R. Swanton, Source Materialfor the Social
and Ceremonial Life of the Choctaw Indians, SMITHSONIAN BULLETIN No. 103, at 87
(1931)).
22. JONES, supra note 3. at 5; Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 8. "[I]n Indian communities
throughout the Nation there is no such thing as an abandoned child because when a child
does have a need for parents for one reason or another, a relative or a friend will take that
child in. It's the extended family concept." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 35 n.4 (1989) (quoting Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 473 (1977)).
23. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 7.
24. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994). See also Brian D. Gallagher, Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: The Congressional Foray into the Adoption Process, 15 N. ILL. U.
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B. Legal RelationshipBetween United States and
Native American Tribes
Originally, the United States government recognized the Indian
tribes as culturally distinct, autonomous groups having the same status
In 1832, the United States Supreme Court
as foreign nations.
affirmed Indian tribes' rights to govern themselves through grants of
tribal sovereignty in treaties between tribes and the United States
government. 26 The Court's ruling reminded the states that all
congressional treaties considered the Indian nations as "distinct
political communities. '27 In 1871, Congress eliminated the practice of
treaty negotiations with Native American tribes and ceased to consider
the tribes as equivalent to separate nations.28 Instead, Congress began
29
to interact legally with Indian tribes solely by passing legislation.
Although Congress passed laws early on meant to protect Native
Americans, those laws were rarely enforced.3 0 This disregard for
rights of Native Americans developed into what was at first an
informal, and later a formal, relocation policy of Native Americans by
the United States government.3 ' In 1830, Congress passed the Indian
33
Removal Act 3 2 in order to relocate eastern tribes to the West.
Congressional control over the Native American tribes expanded with
the enactment of laws emphasizing the "education and civilization" of

L. REV. 81 (1994) (noting that Congress has introduced the Indian tribe as a third party
into cases of adoption involving Native American children).
25.

STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIAN TRIBES: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE To

INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIG-rrS 3 (2d ed. 1992).
26. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). In Worcester, the Court voided a piece
of Georgia legislation that contravened the Cherokee nation's right of tribal
sovereignty. Id. The Court interpreted treaty language stating that the United States
would be "managing all [the tribes'] affairs," to refer primarily to managing trade with
Indians and to exclude Indian self-government. Id. at 553. The Court further explained
that because the Cherokee nation was under the "protection of the United States," the
tribe was receiving the protection of one more powerful but not abandoning their
national character and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master. Id. at 552. The
Court reasoned that to have "divested themselves of the right of self-government on
subjects not concerned with trade . . . could not be for the benefit and comfort" of the
Indian tribes. Id. at 554.
27. Id. at 556.
28. PEVAR, supra note 25, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 4.
32. 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
33. PEVAR, supra note 25, at 5.
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Indian children in order to assimilate Native American culture into that
of the majority culture.34
Increased congressional control diminished the importance and
scope of tribal sovereignty." Starting in the late nineteenth century
and continuing into the first quarter of the twentieth century, Congress
passed legislation with the goals of eradicating tribal governments and
Indian communities.3 6 Consequently, Indians were forcibly
assimilated into the majority society as farmers.37
These assimilation policies had devastating effects on tribal culture
and power.38 In response to this negative impact on Indian tribes,
Congress made an about-face in the early 1930s when it enacted
legislation 39 to "rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him
a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression
and paternalism. ' 4°
Although the legislation of the 1930s encouraged Indians to assert
their rights of self-government, Congress' subsequent adoption of a
termination policy made any assertion of self-government nearly
impossible by the 1950s and 1960s."' The termination policy resulted
in the revocation of federal funds and grants of land for many Native
American tribes.42 By 1966, Congress had eradicated over 100 tribes
through its termination policy. 43 One consequence of termination was
that Native Americans whose tribes disintegrated became subject to
state law because their own tribal power of self-government no longer
existed." Some commentators have characterized the termination
policy as a form of genocide.45
The last major shift in congressional policy regarding the
relationship with Native American tribes occurred in 1968, when
34. Id. at 4.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
36. PEVAR, supra note 25, at 5 (citing 24 Stat. 388, as amended by 25 U.S.C. §§ 331358 (1994)).
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 6 (citing 48 Stat. 984 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (1994))).
40. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1804, at 6 (1934)).
41. Id. at 57.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 57 (citing AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM., FINAL REPORT 232
(1977)).
44. Id.
45. Id. See Rennard Strickland, Genocide-At-Law: An Historic and Contemporary
View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986); see also
Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 3 (calling ICWA "an effort to halt what had become a
genocidal phenomenon").
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Congress passed laws that were consistent with President Nixon's
desire "to strengthen the Indian sense of autonomy without threatening
his sense of community. '46 Congress enacted laws to assist economic
growth of the tribes and to strengthen self-reliance and selfgovernment.47 This policy has withstood the test of time and remains
48
to this day; however, it recently met challenges from Congress.
C. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
1. The Need for Legislation
Congress may have finally recognized its responsibility to make
restitution to Indian tribes for causing them grave political, economic,
and cultural damage over the course of the past 100 years; however,
societal views and practices were slow to follow this recognition.49
One particular arena in which society at large did not recognize tribal

46. PEVAR, supra note 25, at 8 (citing Richard Nixon, Message from the President of
the United States, Recommendations for Indian Policy (1970)).
47. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1524 (1994) (creating an Indian business
development fund), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1494 (1994) (establishing a loan fund for Native
Americans), and Pub. L. No. 93-638 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 25
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.) (allowing Indian tribes to administer federal
government Indian programs)). The ability of Native Americans to administer federal
programs helped to diminish federal control over them. Id.
48. The American Indian Policy Review Commission reported as follows:
[T]he long-term objective of Federal-Indian policy [should] be the
development of tribal governments into fully operational governments
exercising the same powers and shouldering the same responsibilities as other
local governments. This objective should be pursued in a flexible manner
which will respect and accommodate the unique cultural and social attributes of
the individual Indian tribes.
Id. at 9 (quoting AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM., FINAL REPORT 89-90 (1977)).
President Reagan reaffirmed this congressional policy: "[T]his administration intends
to restore tribal governments to their rightful place among governments of this nation
and to enable tribal governments, along with State and local governments, to resume
control over their own affairs." Id. (quoting President's Statement on Indian Policy, 96
PUB. PAPERS 99 (1984)). In June of 1996, the committee on Indian Affairs struck from a
proposed bill provisions that "had great potential for harm . . . to fundamental
principles of Federal-tribal relations and tribal sovereignty." S. REP. No. 104-335, at
14 (1996).
49. For example, even though the Indian Religions Freedom Act of 1978 afforded
protection of Indian religions, the Department of Agriculture "bureaucrats hesitated to
write implementing regulations to clarify the meaning of the act, and courts tended to
find the act too vague to enforce." WILCOMB B. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND, WHITE
MAN'S LAW 253 (2d ed. 1995). Also, legal disputes between Indian tribes and states that
began to arise in the 1970's over water rights have persisted well into the early 1990's,
even though partnerships which would have resolved those disputes were possible. Id.
at 275. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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culture and autonomy was child welfare. 50 Although tribes possessed
the "inherent" right to regulate domestic relations,5' Indian families
faced greater risks of involuntary separation than did the average
American family.

2

Cultural differences and biases existed with members of the
judiciary and with many social workers,53 making it difficult for these
decision makers to accept the Native American cultural philosophy of
the holistic tribe. 4 Because of such differences, these state actors
contributed to the widespread removal of Native American children
from their homes to foster and adoptive placements in non-Native
American homes.55 Chief Calvin Isaac of the Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians commented:
One of the most serious failings of the present system is that
Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural
parents by nontribal government authorities who have no basis
for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises
underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the
individuals who decide the fate of our children are at best
ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst contemptful of the
Indian way and convinced that removal, usually to a non-Indian
household or institution, can only benefit an Indian child.5 6

In the 1970s, when this most recent version of congressional
restitution policy was fairly new, the removal of children from their
Native American families and tribes for the reason of physical abuse
50. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
5 1. JONES, supra note 3, at 7; PEVAR, supra note 25, at 100.
52. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530-32.
53. "Judicial bias may be unintentional, even unconscious: 'For most judges, for
most lawyers, for most human beings, we are as unconscious of our value patterns as we
are of the oxygen that we breathe.'" Erik W. Aamot-Snapp, Note, When Judicial
Flexibility Becomes Abuse of Discretion: Eliminating the "Good Cause" Exception in
Indian Child Welfare Act Adoptive Placements, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1167, 1170 n.12
(1995) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 565 (1961) (Douglas J.,
dissenting) (citing FELIX S. COHEN, LEGAL CONSCIENCE 169 (1960))). "The abusive
actions of social workers would largely be nullified if more judges were themselves
knowledgeable about Indian life and required a sharper definition of child abuse and
neglect." H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.
3069) 7530, 7533.
54. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 10.
55. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10. In 1969 and again in 1974, the Association of
American Indian Affairs (AAIA) conducted surveys of states with large Indian
populations and found that twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Indian children
became "separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or
institutions." Id. at 9.
56. H.R. REP. No. 104-808 at 16-17 (1996) (quoting Hearings on S. 1214 Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 152, 155-56 (1977)) .
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was infrequent.5 7 Instead, social workers cited "neglect" or "social
deprivation," along with vague allegations that children suffered
psychological damage as a result of living with their parents, as
grounds for placing Indian children outside of their family and tribe.58
In fact, tribal communities were sometimes astounded to learn that
courts deemed to be "unfit" the parents and caregivers who the
communities considered adequate or even excellent.59 Cultural clash is
the main reason for this disparity
of opinion in the ability or adequacy
6
of Native American caregivers. 0
2. The Purpose of ICWA
Aside from personal upheaval for families and children, 6' this
widespread removal of Native American children from their families
had detrimental effects 62 on Native American tribes, which depended

57. Two studies of two separate tribes in different areas of the country showed that
physical abuse was the reason for removing Indian children from the family and tribe in
only one percent of the cases. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Because of the importance of extended families in Indian culture, an Indian
child might have several relatives as caregivers who have a close relationship with the
child. Id. Non-Indian social workers who are unfamiliar with this custom would assume
that the birth parents were irresponsible and neglectful for leaving a child with people
other than members of the nuclear family and would use this occurrence as the basis for
termination of parental rights. Id. In addition, social workers frequently cited alcohol
abuse as the grounds for terminating Indian parental rights; however, in areas where
Indian and non-Indian alcoholism rates were equivalent, children were more often
removed from the Indian parents. Id.
61. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 3 n.9 (citing Joseph Westermeyer, The Apple
Syndrome in Minnesota: A Compilation of Racial-Ethnic Discontinuity, 10 J.
OPERATIONAL PSYCHOL. 134 (1979) (explaining that society does not grant a white
cultural identity to Indian children raised in non-Indian homes, but instead imposes upon
these children an Indian identity which no longer belongs to them, resulting in feelings
of isolation and a lack of tribal identity during adolescence)).
62. Id. at 5 n.21. One commentator describes detrimental effects on Indian families
and children as follows:
After decades of being told that there is no value in their language, religion,
and culture, of suffering the indignities of forced relocation, and of having
their children forcibly removed from their homes because of cultural
ethnocentrism, low self-esteem, self-hate, and a sense of alienation and
desperation are not uncommon phenomena among Indian people.
Id. (citing Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the
Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 363 (1986)). "Cultural disorientation, a
person's sense of powerlessness, his loss of self-esteem - these may be the most potent
forces at work. They arise, in large measure, from our national attitudes as reflected in
long-established Federal policy and from arbitrary acts of Government." H.R. REP. No.
95-1386, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7534.
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upon the unity of their communities and traditions for their survival.63
In order to address the devastating effects which Native American
culture suffered at the hands of non-Indians,64 Congress enacted
ICWA in 1978.6 The congressional declaration of policy contained
66
within the Act clearly reflects the reasons for enacting ICWA:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance
to Indian 67
tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs.

This national policy declaration sets forth two goals of ICWA: (1)
protection of the best interests of Indian children, and (2) promotion of
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.68 The Act
63. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
64. See.supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
65. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
66. Id. § 1902; H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 8 (quoting the purpose of the bill H.R.
12533, 95th Cong. (1978)).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
68. Id. Importantly, the policy seems to equate the two goals, and, in fact, one might
argue that the goal of tribal security overshadows that of the individual child because the
policy implies that placing Indian children with tribal members is in the best interest of
those children. Id. See also Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that ICWA's premise
is that it is in the best interest of an Indian child that the role of the tribal community in
the child's life be protected; thus, "the dual purposes promoted by the Act-the 'best
interests of Indian children' and the promotion of 'stability and security of Indian tribes
and families'-are intertwined"). See also JONES, supra note 3, at 5-6, commenting on
the relationship between the best interest of the child and ICWA:
This policy objective may well clash with the commonly accepted theory of
"best interest of the child" [which is] propagated by many in the non-native
social work community and . . . emphasizes the importance of a child's

psychological bonding with at least one adult who is perceived by that child
as his or her psychological parent ...
.. . Congress did not adopt [this standard of the best interest of the child]
when it enacted ICWA. Instead, as the legislative history professes, Congress
concluded that proper implementation of the act itself would serve the best
interest of the Native American child.
Id. See generally Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act and the Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 GONz. L. REV. 353
(1991/92) (depicting the dichotomy between the Anglo best interest of the child
standard and ICWA best interest of the child standard, with the latter encompassing ties
to one's own culture). 'The Act is based on the fundamental assumption that it is in the
Indian child's best interest that its relationship to the tribe be protected." In re Appeal
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specifically sets out congressional findings as support for its legislative
action and declaration of policy.69
3. Jurisdiction
ICWA's jurisdictional provisions are the core provisions of the
Act.70 These provisions give more power and control to tribal courts7
through the use of the tribal governing systems and Native American
judges. 7' Tribal judges are generally more knowledgeable than state
judges about Native American customs and traditions that affect Indian
in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994). Section 1901 states in part:
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the Indian
tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people, the
Congress finds(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitution
provides that "The Congress shall have Power . . .To regulate Commerce...
with Indian tribes" and, through this and other constitutional authority,
Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs;
(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of
dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection
and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources;
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a
direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or
are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by
the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal
public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such
children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions;
and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.
Id. (footnotes ommitted)
70. JONES, supra note 3, at 29 (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989)).
71. Id.
72. Most tribal courts are similar to those of the American court system of state and
federal courts. PEVAR, supra note 25, at 97. While tribes have flexibility in creating
their court systems, they still must comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act, which
confers certain United States constitutional rights upon those subject to tribal court
jurisdiction. Id. at 98, 240. This flexibility results in differences in structure and
procedure of tribal courts among tribes. Id. at 98. 'Tribal courts ... have been centrally
concerned with the overall concept of justice and have oftentimes managed to be free of
the obsession with technicalities that has so often plagued non-tribal court systems."
Id. (quoting Sage v. Lodge Grass Sch. Dist. No. 27, 13 Indian L. Rep. 6035, 6040 (Crow
Ct. App.) (1986)). The flexibility of tribal courts and their emphasis on justice'allow
for tribal courts to be more creative or experimental with configuring dispute
resolutions. Id.
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children.73 Thus, the Act gives tribal courts and judges a wide range
of jurisdiction over important decisions affecting Native American
children, families, and tribal social structure.7 4
ICWA delegates two types of jurisdiction to Native American tribal
courts: exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction. 75 Tribal
jurisdiction is exclusive over "any child custody proceeding involving
an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of
such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the
State by existing Federal law. 76 The exclusive jurisdiction provision
further requires that the tribe retain exclusive jurisdiction over wards of
the tribal court, regardless of the residence or domicile of the child.77
If, however, an Indian child is the subject of either a foster care
placement proceeding or a termination of parental rights proceeding,
then ICWA's jurisdictional grant to tribes is concurrent with state court
jurisdiction.78 In either of those proceedings, even if an Indian child is
not domiciled or residing on the Native American reservation, the Act
expresses a preference that the court "shall" transfer the proceeding to
the tribal court upon the petition of either a parent or the tribe as long
as (1) there is no showing of good cause that the state court retain
jurisdiction over the case, and (2) as long as neither parent objects to
the transfer. 79 This provision is meaningful to Native American tribes
because geographical limits of words like "domicile" and "residence"
are not as important to them as is the child's membership in the tribe.8"
73. Id. at 98.
74. Id.
75. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), (b) (1994). The United States Supreme Court has also
termed concurrent jurisdiction "presumptive jurisdiction." Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
76. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). The definition of reservation includes "Indian country" and
"any lands ... title to which is either held by the United States in trust for the benefit of
any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to a
restriction by the United States against alienation." Id. § 1903(10). "Indian country" is
defined in a criminal statute, the Major Crimes Act, as: "(a) all land within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government . . ..(b)
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States ...and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished." 18 U.S.C. §
1151 (1994).
77. 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(a). Domicile is a place where a person has a settled connection
for certain legal purposes, either because his home is there or because it is assigned by
law to him and a place from which a person has no intention of moving or to which a
person has the intention of returning. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicil § 1 (1996).
78. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
79. Id.
80. Patrice Kunesh-Hartman, Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
Protecting Essential Tribal Interests, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 131, 151 (1989). "Tribal
members share responsibility for all their fellow members." Id.
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The state court, however, must allow the tribal court the opportunity to
decline jurisdiction over a particular case. 8'
The Act defines child custody proceedings to include foster care
placements, terminations of parental rights, pre-adoptive placements,
and adoptive placements.8 2 A child custody proceeding excludes cases
of delinquency or of child custody placements ensuing from a divorce
of the parents.83 By definition, an Indian child is any unmarried
person who is less than eighteen years of age and who is a member of
an Indian tribe or is both (1) eligible to be a member in an Indian tribe
and (2) is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.84 The
legislative history of ICWA notes that although Native American adults
have the right to exile themselves from their tribe, this right has no
meaning for children who generally lack the capacity to make a fully
informed decision about tribal enrollment.
One source of confusion for state courts is ICWA's requirement that
only absent good cause to the contrary should the state court transfer a
foster care or termination of parental rights proceeding to the tribal
court.8 6 This confusion occurs because ICWA does not explain what
factors 7the state court should consider when determining "good
8
cause."
81. Id. Legislative history indicates that the intent of section 1911(b) (the
concurrent jurisdiction provision) was to permit a state court to use a modified form of
forum non conveniens to insure that the "rights of the child as an Indian, the Indian
parents or custodian, and the tribe are fully protected" in appropriate cases. H.R. REP.
No. 95-1386, at 21 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7544.
82. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 1903(4).
85. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 20 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7533. The house report explains that "[bilood relationship is the very touchstone of a
person's right to share in the cultural and property benefits of an Indian tribe." Id.
Indian tribes have inherent authority to determine their membership and enrollment.
PEVAR, supra note 25, at 85. "As the Supreme Court has noted, '[a] tribe's right to define
its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its
existence as an independent political community."' Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978)).
86. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). See infra note 87.
87. There are a number of ways that a court can use "good cause" to achieve the
purpose of ICWA. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 80, at 56. For guidance on the
determination of "good cause," the courts may look to case law, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs guidelines, or both. Id. The case law is undecided as to whether the best interest
of the child is an appropriate factor to consider in a determination of "good cause"
transfer of presumptive jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re T.R.M. 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind.
1988); In re T.S. 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990). But see, e.g., Ex rel Eleanor Armell, 550
N.E.2d 1060 (I11.
App. Ct. 1990) (holding that state law and the idea of the best interest
of the child may not be considered in a decision of whether to transfer a case to the tribal
court pursuant to concurrent jurisdiction under ICWA). The Bureau of Indian Affairs
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A second source of confusion for state courts is that the Act does
not provide a definition of "domicile. ' 8 As a result, much litigation
has focused on what constitutes the domicile of an Indian child. 89
Moreover, the interpretation of a child's domicile is of crucial
importance to the children and their tribe because the determination of
jurisdiction depends upon the children's domicile.' °
4. Adoption
In addition to the important jurisdictional provisions, ICWA
provides several forms of protection for Native American individuals
and tribes involved in foster care, termination of parental rights
proceedings, and adoptions, regardless of whether the tribal or state
court holds the proceeding.9 ' ICWA expressly protects not only the
individual parties in a child custody proceeding, but also the tribe by
granting it a separate interest in the proceeding.92 The ICWA
protection of the tribal unit in order to foster tribal survival embodies
the congressional finding that "there is no resource that is more vital to
guidelines state that "good cause" not to transfer the proceeding may exist if any of the
following exists: (1) the proceeding was at an advanced stage when the state court
received the petition to transfer, (2) the Indian child is over twelve and objects to the
transfer, (3) the evidence necessary to decide the case could not be adequately presented
in the tribal court without undue hardship to the parties or witnesses, (4) the parents of a
child over five years of age are not available and the child has had little or no contact
with the child's tribe or members of the child's tribe. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,591 § C.3 (1979)
(not codified).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 89-90. The congressional findings and policy
provisions of ICWA lend guidance to the interpretation of "domicile." See 25 U.S.C. §§
1901, 1902. Additionally, section 1921 of ICWA may be helpful in defining "domicile"
under the Act, and it provides, "[i]n any case where State or Federal law applicable to a
child custody proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of
protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the
rights provided under this subchapter, the State or Federal court shall apply the State or
Federal standard." Id. § 1921. Further instruction as to the interpretation of "domicile"
may be found in the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines; however, these are not binding
on state courts. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,591 § C.3 (1979) (not codified).
89. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 80, at 151. The issue of what constitutes a child's
domicile is the dispositive one in In re S.S. In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 657 N.E.2d
935, 935-53 (I11.1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
90. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a), (b); see PEVAR, supra note 25, at 300.
91. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
92. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. These protections represent an attempt by Congress to
recognize and give life to the holistic cultural identity of Native Americans as part of the
larger unit of the tribe. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24 (discussing the group
identity Native Americans typically develop as part of their cultural heritage). Generally
speaking, "Indian cultures focus on the collective rights of the community, permitting
individual rights to bow more readily to the needs of the community." Goldsmith, supra
note 3, at I.
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existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
the continued
93
children.
First, the Act grants to the tribe the right to intervene at any point in
94
proceedings terminating the parental rights over an Indian child.
Second, ICWA requires the moving party in a child custody
proceeding to give notice 95 both to the subject child's tribe and her
parent or Indian custodian.96 In addition to notice, the Act affords
Indian parents the right to court-appointed counsel in any removal,
placement, or termination proceeding,97 as well as the right to examine
reports and documents filed with the court in furtherance of the
termination of parental rights.98 Indian parents' rights are also
protected by ICWA's requirement that a party bringing a petition to
terminate parental rights must satisfy the court that active yet
unsuccessful efforts have been made to prevent "the breakup" of the
Indian family. 99 Moreover, in proceedings to terminate the parental
rights of Indian parents, petitioners must prove their case "beyond a
reasonable doubt,"' ° which is a high standard to meet. Lastly, ICWA
authorizes parents to withdraw consent to an adoptive placement at any
time prior to the final decree of termination of parental rights or

93. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
94. Id. § 1911(c).
95. Id. § 1912(a). Subsection (a) "was amended to provide that the court would require
such notice where it had actual or constructive knowledge of the Indian affiliation of the
child." H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 21 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7544.
96. "'Indian custodian' means any Indian person who has legal custody of an Indian
child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary physical care,
custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such child." 25 U.S.C. §
1903(6). Non-Indian custodians of Indian children do not qualify as Indian custodians
under ICWA even if the person is a biological relative of one of the birth parents.
JONES, supra note 3, at 37. In contrast, the non-Indian custodian does qualify as a
preferred relative care giver for a foster care situation. Id. at 37, 86; see 25 U.S.C. §
1903(2) (defining "extended family member" to mean one "defined by the law or custom
of the Indian child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom .... a person who has
reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent).
97. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b).
98. Id. § 1912(c).
99. Id. § 1912(d).
100. Id. § 1912(f). Evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the continued
custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child. Id.
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adoption.' 0 ' If this withdrawal of consent occurs, the child
subsequently returns to the birth parent. 2
Importantly, in any termination of a parental rights proceeding held
in the state court, the Indian child, parent, or tribe may petition to
invalidate the action upon a showing that the proceeding violated any
of the above rights or protections of ICWA.'0 3 ICWA also provides
that if state or federal law affords a higher degree of protection to the
parent, then that state or federal standard should apply in lieu of the
related ICWA provision.' 4
In addition to protections for the parties, ICWA sets forth
preferences for adoptive placements of Indian children. 05 The
adoptive preferences apply to placements "under State law."" Absent
good cause to the contrary, adoptive placement goes first to a member
of the child's extended family; 0 7 second, to other members of the
Indian tribe; and third, to other Indian families.'0 8 ICWA further
requires that in meeting the preference requirements, the standards to
consider are those social and cultural standards of the tribe in which
the parent or extended family resides, or with which they maintain
social and cultural ties."°
5. Exceptions
In addition to statutorily excepted delinquency proceedings and
custody proceedings arising from a divorce, ICWA also does not
apply in some states which have adopted a judicially created doctrine
called the existing Indian family exception." 0 Although this doctrine
opposes the language of ICWA and the only United States Supreme
101. Id. § 1913(b), (c).
102. Id. This reflects the Native American culture's tendency to place a greater
emphasis on the tribal community rather than on the individual child who might
temporarily suffer from this type of withdrawal. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 7-8.
103. 25 U.S.C. § 1914.
104. Id. § 1921.
105. See Id. § 1915(a).
106. Id.
107. See id. § 1903(2) (for definition of extended family).
108. Id. § 1915(a).
109. Id. § 1915(d). Congress' House Report on ICWA explains that, "All too often,
State public and private agencies, in determining whether or not an Indian family is fit
for foster care or adoptive placement of an Indian child, apply a white, middle class
standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement with the Indian family." H.R. REP.
No. 95-1386, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546.
110. Gallagher, supra note 24, at 81 (citing Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian
Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L. REV. 465, 469-70
(1993)).
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Court interpretation of ICWA, some courts follow the doctrine and
hold that proceedings are covered by ICWA only when children are
"removed from an existing Indian family, home, or culture."'"
The first case to employ this "exception" was Baby Boy L.'" 2 In
this state adoption proceeding, an infant's non-Indian mother
voluntarily consented to the infant's adoption by petitioners." 3
Although the baby's unmarried father was an Indian enrolled in the
Kiowa tribe and the baby was an "Indian child""' as defined by
ICWA, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that ICWA did not apply
because the Act's only concern is protection against the removal of
Indian children from existing Indian families and, therefore, from their
Native American experiences and upbringing." 5 In arriving at this
interpretation of the Act, the court partly relied on ICWA's policy that
one of ICWA's goals is to provide federal standards for the "removal
of Indian children from their families." ' 6 The court also relied on the
legislative history of the Act," 7 interpreting it to mean that the Act's
overriding concern was maintaining family and tribal relationships
existing in Indian homes."' The opinion supported its reasoning by
quoting a professor's law journal article, "'Under the Act . . . the
common element is the parents' loss of control over the child ....
The Act principally applies to cases where a state court attempts to
remove an Indian childfrom his or her home on grounds of the alleged
incompetence or brutality of the parents.' "
In the only case in which the United States Supreme Court has dealt
with any interpretation of ICWA, Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 20 the Court indicated that the existing Indian
family exception was not a sound interpretation of ICWA because the

I 1 i1. Gallagher, supra note 24, at 96. See also PEVAR, supra note 25, at 304; JONES,
supra note 3, at 15-17.
1 12. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
113. Id. at 172.
114. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). Baby Boy L. became enrolled as a tribal member
during the year-long court proceedings. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 173.
115. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
116. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901).
117. Id. See supra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
118. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
119. Id. at 176 (quoting Russell Lawrence Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1305 (1980)).
Mr. Barsh's
analysis, however, ignores the stated purpose of the Act to benefit and protect a tribe's
interest in the welfare of its children. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
120. 490 U.S. 30, 51 (1989).
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tribe had rights under ICWA that could not be frustrated by parents'
actions. 2 ' The Court stated:
Tribal jurisdiction under [section] 1911(a) [of ICWA] was not
meant to be defeated by the actions of individual members of
the tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely about the
interests of Indian children and families, but also about the
impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian
children adopted by non-Indians.' 22
In other words, Holyfield implied that ICWA covered Indian
children's proceedings even though the subject children of the
proceeding had not lived on the tribe's reservation or with their
biological Indian parents. 23 Despite Holyfield's strong suggestion
that the existing Indian family exception is an inappropriate
interpretation of ICWA, several states have since either instituted or
continued to employ the existing Indian family exception in order to
circumvent ICWA. 24 Most courts, however, have held that ICWA
applies to any child25 custody proceeding in which the child involved is
Native American. 1
6. Interpretation of ICWA
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield 126 provides the
only United States Supreme Court interpretation of ICWA. The
27
Holyfield Court directly addressed the issue of children's domicile'
under ICWA pursuant to its jurisdictional provisions. 28 The Court
held that the lower court's reliance on its state law definition of

121. Id. "These congressional objectives make clear that a rule of domicile that
would permit individual Indian parents to defeat the ICWA's jurisdictional scheme is
Id. at 51. See also supra text
inconsistent with what Congress intended."
accompanying notes 75-81, 94, 96 (explaining the rights of a tribe under ICWA).
122. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49.
123. Id. at 51.
124. Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1549 (1996); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992); In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d
305 (Wash. 1992); S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
125. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989); In re Coconino County,
736 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); In re Adoption of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194
(Ct. App. 1991); In re C.A.J., 709 P.2d 604 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); In re Baby Boy Doe,
849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993); In re T.J.J. & G.L.J., 366 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); In re M.E.M., 679 P.2d 1241 (Mont. 1984); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian
Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Oscar C., 559 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Fam. Ct. 1990).
126. 490 U.S. at 30.
127. Id at 30-54. See also supra text accompanying notes 75-79 discussing
jurisdiction and domicile under ICWA.
128. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)(b) (1994).
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domicile controverted congressional intent. 29 The Court explained
that the state should look to generally accepted federal and common
law definitions of domicile in order to comply with the congressional
intent that courts implement ICWA according to a uniform federal law
of domicile. 30
In Holyfield, unmarried parents who were enrolled members of the
Choctaw Indian tribe and who resided on and were domiciliaries of the
reservation consented to the adoption of their children by the
Holyfields.13' The adoption decree, however, omitted any reference to
ICWA or the infants' Native American heritage. 32 Two months later,
the tribe moved to vacate the adoption because under the application of
ICWA, the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption
proceeding. 33 The trial court ruled in a one-page opinion that the tribe
never had exclusive jurisdiction over the proceeding for two reasons:
(1) the birth mother took steps to ensure that the babies were born
outside the reservation, and (2) the children had never resided or been
physically present on the Choctaw Indian reservation.' 34 Recognizing
that the issue of jurisdiction depended upon the children's domicile,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision
deciding that the twins were not domiciled on the reservation according
to Mississippi state law. 35 Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed
this state court decision. 136
The Court's analysis of the appeal from the state court decision
began with an overview of ICWA. 3 7 The discussion focused on three
areas: (1) ICWA's congressional hearings, anecdotal testimony, and
statistical reports; (2) its legislative history and the House Report on
ICWA; and (3) the Act's language, congressional findings, and several
other provisions. 38 The Court noted that the hearings on ICWA
129. Holyfleld, 490 U.S. at 49.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. at 37.
132. Id. at 38.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 39.
135. Id. The lower court stated:
At no point in time can it be said the twins resided on or were domiciled within
the territory set aside for the reservation. Appellant's argument that living
within the womb of their mother qualifies the children's residency on the
reservation may be lauded for its creativity; however, apparently it is
unsupported by any law within this state ....
Id. (quoting In re B.B. & G.B., 511 So. 2d 918 (Miss. 1987)).
136. Id. at 41.
137. Id. at 32-37.
138. Id.
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emphasized the negative impact that the removal of Native American
The Court further
children had on the tribes as separate entities.'
credited non-tribal government actors' lack of knowledge of Native
American culture as the principal reason for the high rates of removal
of Indian children. 40 Significantly, the Court reasoned that the
congressional findings included as part of ICWA 4 ' reflected the
impact of this removal of children caused largely by non-Indian
government actions. 42 From its overview, the Court determined that
ICWA supplies a federal policy that "mak[es] sure that Indian child
welfare determinations are not based on 'a white, middle-class
in many cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian
standard t which,
43
family."

The Court's analysis, more specifically, included an evaluation of
congressional intent in order to determine the meaning of "domicile"
under ICWA, as the Act does not include a definition of "domicile."' 44
The Court stated that, in general, and unless it plainly indicates
otherwise, Congress does not make the application of the federal
legislation dependent upon state law. 45 According to the Court, there
are two reasons for this: (1) Congress intends federal statutes to be
139. Id. at 34. Interestingly, the court does not state from where the children were
removed. But see supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning
of cases, seemingly contradictory to Holyfield, that have interpreted legislative history
to support the existing Indian family exception). The Court quotes Mr. Calvin Isaac,
Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and representative of the
National Tribal Chairmen's Association's testimony:
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our
children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to
be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their People.
Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut the tribes' ability to continue
as self-governing communities. Probably in no area is it more important that
tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially and culturally
determinative as family relationships.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34 (quoting Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Subcommittee on
Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
95th Cong. 193 (1978)). See also supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing
negative impact on children caused by broken ties between them and their tribes).
140. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 35 n.4. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
141. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994).
142. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 35.
143. Id. at 37 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 178
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530).
144. Id. at 43. The narrow issue in Holyfield became "whether there is any reason to
believe that Congress intended the ICWA definition of 'domicile' to be a matter of state
law." Id.
145. Id. (citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943); NLRB v. Natural
Gas Utility Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc.,
460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983)).
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applied uniformly nationwide,"4 and (2) federal programs would face
impairment if state law controlled.'47
Applying these general rules of statutory interpretation, the Court
reasoned that because Congress enacted ICWA to combat problematic
state actions, it was "most improbable that Congress would have
intended to leave the scope of the statute's key jurisdictional provision
subject to definition by state courts as a matter of state law."'' 4' The
Court also concluded that Congress "could hardly have intended the
lack of nationwide uniformity that would result from state-law
definitions of domicile" because state-law definitions of domicile might
allow for a state to render inapplicable the exclusive jurisdiction
provision of ICWA. 149 Finally, the Court determined that if Congress
intended for states to define "domicile," it expressly would have stated
so in ICWA. 5 °
Lastly, the Holyfield Court's analysis set out to define "domicile."
The Court looked to the generally accepted meaning of the term
domicile to the extent that it is consistent with the purpose of ICWA
and with congressional intent.' 5 ' The Court arrived at a number of
principles for inclusion in the meaning of "domicile" under ICWA.
First, domicile is not necessarily the same as residence.' 52 In other
words, people may live in places where they are not domiciliaries. 53
'
Second, adults obtain their domiciles, which stay the same until the
establishment of a new one, according to physical presence in a place
and an intent to remain there. 5 4 Finally, children are generally
incapable of forming the intent necessary to establish their domiciles;
therefore, their parents' domiciles typically determine children's
domicile. 5 5 The Court summarized, "Under these principles, it is
entirely logical that '[o]n occasion, a child's domicile of origin will be
146. Id. at 43 (citing Jerome, 318 U.S. at 104; Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119-20;
United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1941)).
147. Id. at44.
148. Id. at 45.
149. Id. at 45-46. "[A] State might apply its law of domicile in such a manner as to
render inapplicable § 1911 (a) [exclusive jurisdiction provision] even to a child who had
lived several years on the reservation but was removed from it for the purpose of
adoption. Even in the less extreme case.... Indian children.., could be transported for
adoption to States ... where the law of domicile permitted the proceedings to take place
in state court." (emphasis added). Id. at 46 n.20.
150. Id. at47.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 48.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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in a place where the child has never been."" 56 The Holyfield Court
ultimately held that the children were domiciled on the reservation.
Thus, the7 tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction of their case under
ICWA. 1
In sum, according to Holyfield, children's domiciles do not alter
because of actions of their parents. 5 8 Such an alteration via the
application of state law would contravene Congress' intent to protect
not only the interests of individual Indian children and families, but
also the independent interest of the tribe, and would also contravene
Congress' intent to minimize the detrimental effects on Indian children
who grow up isolated from their Indian community and culture. 59 To
illustrate its conclusion that its federal definition of domicile applies
under the Act, the Court incorporated a prior explanation of this
concept provided by the Supreme Court of Utah:
To the extent that [state] abandonment law operates to
permit [the child's] mother to change [the child's] domicile as
part of a scheme to facilitate his adoption by non-Indians while
she remains a domiciliary of the reservation, it conflicts with and
undermines the operative scheme established by [the
jurisdictional] subsections [1911(a)] and [1913(a)] to deal with
children of domiciliaries of the reservation and weakens
considerably the tribe's ability to assert its interest in its
children. The protection of this tribal interest is at the core of
the ICWA, which recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the
child which is distinct from but on a parity with the interest of
the parents. This relationship between Indian tribes and Indian
156.

Id. (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14 cmt. b (1971)).

157. Id. at 53. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a) (1994).
158. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49. The Court rejected the argument that the
interpretation of domicile should differ and depend upon state law because the birth
mother made efforts to give birth outside of the reservation in order to allow for the
adoption of the children by the non-Indian Holyfields because "that was precisely part of
Congress' concern." Id. at 51-52.
159. Id. at 52. The Court described these detrimental effects with the following
quote:
I think the cruelest trick that the white man has ever done to Indian children is
to take them into adoption courts, erase all of their records and send them off
to some nebulous family that has a value system that is A-I in the State of
Nebraska and that child reaches 16 or 17, he is a little brown child residing in
a white community and he goes back to the reservation and he has absolutely
no idea who his relatives are, and they effectively make him a non-person and
I think

. . .

they destroy him.

Id. at 50 n.24 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-597, at 43 (1977)). In general, the Court
concludes that, "'[t]he Act is based on the fundamental assumption that it is in the Indian
child's best interest that its relationship to the tribe be protected."' Id. (quoting In re
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)).
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children domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in other
ethnic cultures found in the United States. It is a relationship
that many non-Indians find difficult to understand and that
non-Indian courts are slow to recognize. It is precisely in
recognition of this relationship, however, that the ICWA
designates the tribal court as the exclusive forum for the
determination of custody and adoption matters for reservationdomiciled Indian children, and the preferred forum for
nondomiciliary Indian children.
[State] abandonment law
cannot be used to frustrate the federal legislative judgment
expressed in the ICWA that the interests of the tribe in custodial
decisions made with respect to Indian 60children are as entitled to
respect as the interests of the parents.1

Finally, in its reversal, the Supreme Court admonished the tribal
court to consider that the children had spent their three years of life,
since birth, with their adoptive parents and that a separation from these
parents would doubtless cause the children pain.' 6' Significantly, the
Court underscored that the disputed issue was not where the children
should live, but instead, whether the tribal or state court should make
the custody determination about the children. 162 Without jurisdiction,
the Court could not determine whether the interest of the tribe should
outweigh the difficulty in separating the children from their adoptive
family, but instead it "defer[red] to the experience, wisdom, and
compassion of the [Choctaw] tribal courts to fashion an appropriate
63
remedy."1

Although many cases have dealt with interpretation of ICWA's
jurisdictional provisions, only two cases since the Holyfield decision
have looked precisely at the issue of domicile in relation to jurisdiction

160. Id. at 52-53 (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-70
(1986)). The Court also mentioned in a footnote that, "[tihere is some authority for the
proposition that abandonment can effectuate a change in the child's domicile, In re
Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d at 967, although this may not be the majority rule." Id.
at 51 n.26 (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22, cmt. e (1971)
(explaining that an abandoned child generally retains the domicile of the lastabandoning parent)). The Court, however, implicitly dismissed this minority authority
by emphasizing that, "[i]n any case, . . . the Supreme Court of Utah declined in the
Halloway case to apply Utah abandonment law to defeat the purpose of ICWA.
Similarly, the conclusive statement of the Supreme Court of Mississippi [the court
below] that the twin babies had been 'legally abandoned,' 511 So. 2d at 921, cannot be
determinative of ICWA jurisdiction." Id.
161. Id. at 53.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 54 (quoting Halloway, 732 P.2d at 972).
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under ICWA: In re W.L. 164 and In re S.S. 165 In In re W.L., the
Supreme Court of Montana explained that, "[t]he guiding light in
determining domicile for the purpose of jurisdiction is Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield .... "66 In W.L., the parents
and the children were enrolled members of their Indian tribe. 6' The
birth mother contended that although the state court had properly
obtained jurisdiction under ICWA after consideration of a transfer to
the family's tribal court, the state court lost its jurisdiction when an
extended temporary custody order lapsed during a time when the
mother was domiciled on the Indian reservation. 6 The court held,
however, that because the mother was not domiciled on the reservation
at the commencement of the proceedings, jurisdiction remained with
the state court. 16 9 In other words, once a court obtains jurisdiction, it
retains it until the final disposition of the case.' 70 The opinion,
however, leaves some questions unanswered because it does not
clarify whether the children were living with their mother and it does
not specify whether the tribal court would have exclusive jurisdiction
had the mother been domiciled on the reservation at the beginning
of
7
the proceedings or if the state court had lost its jurisdiction. '
D. Illinois ParentalRights Termination andAdoption Law
Jurisdiction over child custody proceedings is important partly
because one possible outcome of such proceedings is the termination
of parents' rights over their children. 72 The right of parents to raise
their children is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.7 7 This right, however,

164. In re W.L., C.L. & B.L., 859 P.2d 1019 (Mont. 1993).
165. In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 657 N.E.2d 935 (I11.
1995); see infra Part III
(discussing In re S.S. and the issue of domicile in that case).
166. In re W.L., 859 P.2d at 1021 (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989)).
167. Id. at 1020.
168. Id. at 1021.
169. Id.
170. Id. The decision was bolstered by the birth father's objection to transferring
jurisdiction to the tribe as well as the tribe's decision not to accept jurisdiction of the
case. Id.
171. Id. at 1019-22.
172. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii) (1994); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-29 (West
1993); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(F) (West Supp. 1996).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.
); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
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is not without limits. 74 The state may intervene in the parent-child
relationship under its parens patrie interest in the welfare of
children. 7 5 Sometimes, this state interest and the parent interest are
aligned. 176
At other times, however, the interests of the state and parent are at
odds with one another.'7 For example, the state will intervene against
78
the parent in suspected cases of abuse and neglect by the parent.
After investigating this possibly abusive or neglectful situation, the
state actors decide what intervention is necessary. 79 State intervention
ranges from no further action following the investigation to the
irrevocable 80 termination of parental rights, with many options in
between.' 8 ' Every state authorizes by statute involuntary termination
82
of parental rights as its most drastic form of family intervention.
One reason that parents' rights over children are terminated, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, is to allow for the adoption of the children
either by caretakers chosen by the birth parents or by caretakers
assigned via state intervention. 83 In Illinois, involuntary parental
rights termination occurs only when a court finds that a parent is
unfit" and that the termination of parental rights is in the best interest
174. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). See also Annette R.
Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False
Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 64 (1995)
(quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 167). "[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting
parental freedom and authority in things affecting ... child[] welfare." Id.
175. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
176. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
177. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67.
178. Douglas E. Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Parental
Rights Termination Cases, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 785, 786 (1994).
179. Id.
180. "A termination of parental rights is both total and irrevocable. Unlike other
custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with no right to visit or communicate with the
child, to participate in, or even to know about, any important decision affecting the
child's religious, educational, emotional, or physical development."
Lassiter v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. See Cressler, supra note 178, at 786 n.7.
182. Id. at 787.
Additionally, parents may also voluntarily consent to the
termination of their parental rights. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-29
(West 1993).
183. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-29; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(F) (West
Supp. 1996).
184. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D). There are seventeen bases for a finding of
parental unfitness in Illinois, including : abandonment of the child; failure to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare;
substantial neglect of the child if continuous or repeated; extreme or repeated cruelty to
the child; failure to protect the child from conditions within his environment injurious
to the child's welfare; depravity; open and notorious adultery or fornication, habitual
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of the child. 8 ' Illinois law provides for bifurcated hearings. First, a
court must find that a parent is unfit according to clear and convincing
evidence.8 6 Second, only after the court finds the parent unfit may it
consider the question of whether
the termination of parental rights is in
87
interests.1
best
children's
the
Illinois law differs significantly, then, from ICWA in the area of
parental rights termination and adoption. Illinois law involves the
balancing of the possibly competing interests of maintaining the family
and protecting children. 18 ICWA, however, interjects another interest
into the analysis: the tribe's interest. 8 9 Because of the emphasis of
Native American culture on the larger cultural group, cultures weigh
these competing interests differently depending upon which culture
holds the scale.' 9°
Moreover, the required standard of proof for the termination of
parental rights differs under Illinois law and ICWA.' 9' Under ICWA,
evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that serious damage
will result to the child if termination of the parent's rights over the
child does not occur. 192 This standard is a higher, more difficult
standard to meet than the one under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.' 93
The evidentiary standard in Illinois for parental rights termination is
only that clear and convincing evidence show that the parent is unfit
according to one of seventeen statutory standards.'94
drunkenness or addiction to drugs (other than those prescribed) for at least one year prior
to proceeding; and a finding of physical abuse under specified provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act of Illinois. Id.
185. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-29(2).
186. Id.
187. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/I. See also In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (111.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994); In re Taylor, 334 N.E.2d 194 (I11.App. Ct.
1975).
188. See Appell & Boyer, supra note 174, at 64. Presumably the interest of family
integrity includes both the individual interest of the child and the individual interest of
the parent; and, presumably the interest of the protection of children includes both the
individual interest of the child and the parens patriae interest of the state. Id.
189. See Gallagher, supra note 24, at 81; Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 4.
190. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 7. Goldsmith argues that "[t]he ever elusive line
delineating what constitutes a right or interest can be drawn only after considering the
particular situation's cultural circumstances." Id. at 8. Applying this theory, then, the
best interest of the child standard required by the Illinois statutes may fairly be termed an
Anglo, or non-Indian, cultural delineation. Cf. Dale, supra note 68, at 365-70
(differentiating between the Anglo-American and Native American best interests
standards).
191. See infra text accompanying notes 190-92.
192. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(0 (1994).
193. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 183-86.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts of the Case
In In re Adoption of S.S. and R.S., children S.S. and R.S. were
the subjects of a petition by their paternal aunt to terminate the parental
rights of the children's birth mother and to adopt them.'95 S.S. and
R.S. were born to unmarried parents.196 Their mother, Betty Jo Iron
Bear, was a Fort Peck Indian and their father, Richard S., was nonIndian. 97 Although the parents originally cared for the children under
a joint custody and parenting agreement, 98 the Circuit Court of Kane
County granted the father's petition to eliminate Iron Bear's physical
right to custody of two months each year.' 99 Iron Bear claimed that
the court terminated her visitation with the children because she
defaulted, although the record on this is unclear.2"
Iron Bear lived on the Fort Peck reservation in Montana and
maintained only sporadic contact with the children. 2° ' The children,
however, lived in Elgin, Illinois, with their father. When Richard S.
could no longer care for the children due to illness, he and the children
moved to live with his sister, Shelly S., in Carpentersville, Illinois. °2
Richard S. died shortly after and the children continued to reside with
their aunt.20 3
A second paternal aunt and her husband, the Tubridys, filed a
petition to terminate the parental rights of Iron Bear and to adopt the
children. 2" They alleged that Iron Bear was an unfit parent because
195. 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
196. Id. at 938.
197. Id.
198. In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 622 N.E.2d 832, 834 (111.App. Ct. 1993), rev'd,
657 N.E.2d 935 (111.1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996). According to the
appellate court the significant facts were not in dispute. Id. at 833-34. Richard S.
established paternity in 1990 in the Circuit Court of Kane County and "[aipparently, in
connection with these proceedings a joint parenting agreement was approved pursuant
to which (according to ironbear[sic]) the father was awarded physical care of the children
for 10 months of the year and lronbear[sic] was awarded physical care for the summer
months." Id. at 834.
199. Id. The appellate court further explained that in April 1992, the circuit court
granted the father's petition to terminate Iron Bear's summer visitation, but that the
circuit court orders were not in the record on appeal. Id.
200. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 938.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. The Supreme Court of Illinois noted that "Richard S. died on November 18,
1992, of a disease he contracted from Iron Bear." Id.
204. Id.

1997]

In re S.S. and R.S.

865

she had abandoned the children and neglected them. 205 Iron Bear
claimed that since the death of Richard S., the Tubridys refused, on at
least one occasion, to allow her to see the children when she tried to
visit them.2 6
Iron Bear filed a motion to transfer the jurisdiction of the adoption
proceeding to the tribal court of Fort Peck.20 7 The Fort Peck tribe also
filed a motion for the same transfer.0 8 Both motions claimed that
ICWA granted the tribe exclusive jurisdiction over the proceeding. 0 9
The circuit court denied the motions to transfer, holding the following:
(1) that ICWA did not apply to the case because the children were not
in jeopardy of being removed from an Indian family 2 0 and (2) that the
children were not domiciled on their mother's reservation. 2t' In other
words, the lower court applied the existing Indian family exception to
avoid the standards and requirements of protection to Indian parents
and tribes afforded by ICWA. 1 2 Based on Holyfield, the appellate
court, with one concurring judge and one dissenting judge, reversed,
holding that ICWA did apply and that the children were domiciliaries
of the reservation; thus, the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over
the case.21 3 The Tubridys filed an interlocutory appeal with the
Supreme Court of Illinois.
B. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded the case of
S.S and R.S. to the trial court with directions for it to hold hearings on
whether Iron Bear had abandoned her children.21 5 The court held that
if Iron Bear had not abandoned the children, then the children's
205. Id. The petition alleged that "Iron Bear had abandoned the children during the
two years prior to the adoption proceedings [and before that time] had engaged in open
and notorious fornication, habitually abused alcohol, and failed to provide the children
with adequate food, clothing and shelter .... " Id.
206. Id. Iron Bear also claimed that the Tubridys had fled with the children out of
state to their home in Ohio. Id. Consequently, the court entered an order requiring the
return of the children to Illinois, and the Tubridys complied with that order. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
210. In re S.S., 622 N.E.2d at 834.
211. fi re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 939.
212. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
213. In re S.S., 622 N.E.2d at 842. The concurring judge did not include a separate
opinion. Id. at 843. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
214. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 938.
215. Id. at 943. Justice Harrison wrote the opinion for the majority court. Id. at 93743.
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domicile was their mother's, the reservation, and the tribe would have
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 1 6 If, however, the trial court
found that Iron Bear had abandoned the children, then the children's
domicile was not the reservation and the state court would have
jurisdiction over the case because the children neither resided nor were
domiciliaries of the reservation.1 7
In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court proceeded under the
assumption that ICWA was applicable.218 The court began its analysis
with an overview of ICWA, including its legislative history as
explained in Holyfield.1 9 In addition to presenting the relevant
defining and jurisdictional provisions of ICWA, the court also quoted
extensively the congressional policy and findings included in
ICWA.22°
Next, by distinguishing Holyfield, the court concluded that
Holyfield did not compel the finding that S.S. and R.S. were
domiciliaries of the Fort Peck reservation. 22 After fully explaining
Holyfield's reasoning that ICWA forbids reliance on state law for a
definition of domicile, the court distinguished the case at hand from
Holyfield 2 In Holyfield, both parents were domiciled on the Indian
reservation, whereas in the case at hand, Richard S. had sole custody
of the children off of the reservation.223 The court reasoned that the
children were Illinois domiciliaries prior to their father's death,
because their father was an Illinois domiciliary. 224 Although the
majority acknowledged the general rule that the domicile of the
children normally shifted to that of their surviving mother after their
father's death, 2 5 the court relied on an exception to this general rule
2 16. Id. at 942. But see infra Part IV.D (criticizing this holding for its consideration
of good cause not to transfer pursuant to concurrent tribal jurisdiction under ICWA).
217. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 942. The court does not explain clearly why the
children's domicile would be Illinois in this situation, although one may infer that it
would be derived from their current caretakers who stand in loco parentis to them. See
id.. See infra text accompanying note 367.
218. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 939.
219. Id. at 939-41 (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 32-37, 43-49 (1989)).
220. Id. at 939-40 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-02 (1988)).
221. Id. at 940-42.
222. Id. at 941-42.
223. Id. at 941.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 942 (citing People ex rel. Noonan v. Wingate, 33 N.E.2d 467 (III. 1941)
(holding that at common law upon the death of the father an infant took the domicile of
its mother). See also 25 AM. JUR. 2D Doinicil § 46 (1996) (stating that upon the death
of the parent to whom custody of a child has been awarded the domicile of the child
becomes that of the surviving parent)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
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which applies in a situation in which the surviving parent has
abandoned the child. 6
The exception to the general rule of domicile states that if children
are "left parentless as a result of death and/or abandonment," and no
legal guardian is appointed for the children, then the children's
domicile follows that of the person who stood in loco parentis and
with whom they lived. 7 However, Native Americans may not use
this doctrine of abandonment in order to avoid the jurisdictional
provisions of ICWA and facilitate the adoption of their children by
non-Indians 228 Because Iron Bear did not scheme to have nonIndians adopt her children,229 the court reasoned that the application of
the exception could "do no possible violence to the purposes of the
Act. '230 The court explained, moreover, that to determine whether
Iron Bear had abandoned her children, the rules of the forum applied
and the allegations of the Tubridys were sufficient under Illinois law to
find abandonment by Iron Bear.
Consequently, the court remanded the issue to the circuit court for a
hearing on abandonment 3 2 The court mandated that if the lower court
found that Iron Bear had not abandoned the children, then the
children's domiciles were the reservation and the tribal court would
have exclusive jurisdiction of the termination of parental rights and
adoption proceedings under ICWA.23 3 If, however, the lower court
found that Iron Bear had abandoned the children, then their domiciles
were Illinois and ICWA granted concurrent jurisdiction over the
proceedings to the state and the tribal courts. 23' Although this
concurrent jurisdiction carries with it the presumption that the tribal
22 cmt. d (1971) (stating that upon the death of the parent who has been awarded legal
custody of the child or with whom the child has been living, the child's domicile shifts
to that of the other parent even if the other parent is domiciled in another state).
226. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 942 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 22 cmts. e, i (1971)).
227. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 cmt. i (1971) and
App. Ct. 1976)).
Donlon v. Miller, 355 N.E.2d 195 (Il1.
228. Id. at 942 (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 52 (1989)). "Permitting individual members of the tribe to avoid tribal exclusive
jurisdiction by the simple expedient of giving birth off the reservation would, to a large
extent, nullify the purpose the ICWA was intended to accomplish." Holyfield, 490 U.S.
at 52.
229. In fact, the opposite was true-Iron Bear was trying to prevent the adoption of
her children by non-Indians.
230. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 942.
231.

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICTOF LAWS § 22 cmt. e (1971)).

232. Id.
233. Id. See 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(a) (1994).
234. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 942; 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
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court should hear the case "in the absence of good cause to the
' the court reasoned that good cause should exist in this
contrary,"235
case to allow the state circuit court to retain jurisdiction over the
Tubridys' "custody petition. 236 In a meaningfully worded and
directive summary paragraph, the majority court stated its opinion as
follows:
[T]he judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the
cause is remanded to the circuit court for a hearing on whether
Iron Bear abandoned R.S. and S.S. If the court finds that there
was no abandonment, it shall enter an order transferring this
cause to the Fort Peck tribal court. If it determines by clear and
convincing evidence that abandonment did occur, it shall
reinstate its prior orders denying transfer to the tribal court and
retain jurisdiction over the Tubridys' cause of action.237
C. The ConcurringOpinion
Justice Heiple's detailed concurring opinion was joined by two
other justices. 8 The opinion delves into the congressional intent and
legislative purpose of ICWA and distinguishes the Holyfield case. 9
Justice Heiple addressed the issue of the existing Indian family
exception24 and the dissent's opposition to that exception. 24 The
concurring opinion argued that Illinois should implement the existing
Indian family exception and that Holyfield does not preclude such an
implementation.242
Justice Heiple supported his argument by first noting that several
courts have employed the existing Indian family exception since
Holyfield;243 second, by reasoning that the exception does not ignore
235. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
236. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 943.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 943-46 (Heiple, J., concurring). Justice Bilandic and Justice Miller joined
in the concurring opinion. Id. at 946.
239. Id. at 944-45 (Heiple, J., concurring).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
241. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 944-46 (Heiple, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 943-44 (Heiple, J., concurring). Justice Heiple argued that the sole issue
in Holyfield was one of domicile because Holyfield did not specifically refer to the
existing Indian family exception; moreover, he argued that the facts of Holyfield are not
analogous to the case of In re S.S. Id. (Heiple, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 944 (Heiple, J., concurring) (citing In re Termination of Parental Rights
of D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991); In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992); In
re Adoption of Infant Boy Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992)). The concurring opinion
also implies that because the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari in any of the postHolyfield decisions, the Court acknowledges and accepts the existing Indian family
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the interest of the tribe; and, third, by concluding that the exception
does not contravene Congress' intent. 2a4 This conclusion that
congressional intent would receive respect even if the exception were
applied was supported in the concurring opinion by the fact that
Congress refused to abolish the existing Indian family exception by
failing to pass certain amendments. These amendments proposed to
make application of ICWA compulsory regardless of whether the child
in an Indian cultural
had "'previously lived in Indian Country,
' 245
environment or with an Indian parent.'
The only reference that the concurring opinion made to the issue of
domicile, the sole issue that the majority addressed, was an assurance
that the requirement of a hearing on abandonment by Iron Bear does
not reveal any prejudice or distrust by the state court toward the tribal
court.246 Although the concurring justice argued that abandonment
hearings in this case are unnecessary because ICWA's inapplicability
removes the issue of domicile from the case, Justice Heiple
nevertheless agreed with the majority opinion that the appellate
decision should be reversed.247
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice McMorrow, joined by two other justices, 24 was the author
of the lengthy dissent in this case.2 49 The dissent clearly and strongly
disapproved of several aspects of the majority opinion. ° Justice
McMorrow criticized the majority's scope, its recitation of facts, its
failure to adhere to congressional intent and policy, its attempt to
concurring). The opinion states, "[i]ndeed, the Supreme
exception. See id. (Heiple, J.,
Court has never granted certiorari in any of the numerous cases where our sister State
courts have employed the exception, including several cases decided after the Supreme
Court's 1988 decision in Holyfield." Id. (Heiple, J., concurring). This statement
ignores the possibility that the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in these cases
since the Court already decided the issue in Holyfield. The statement also contains a
factual error: Holyfield was decided on April 3, 1989. Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
244. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 945 (Heiple, J.,concurring). The concurring opinion
argued, "[s]pecifically, the dissent opines that Holyfield stands for the proposition that
the ICWA grants the tribes an interest in children separate from that of the children's
parents and thus that the existing Indian family exception is improper because it ignores
the tribe's interest. This, however, overstates the case." Id. (Heiple, J.,concurring).
245. Id. (Heiple, J., concurring) (quoting S.1976, 100th Cong. (1987)).
246. Id. (Heiple, J., concurring).
247. Id. (Heiple, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 953 (McMorrow, J.,dissenting). Justices Freeman and Nickels joined in
Justice McMorrow's dissent.
249. Id. at 946-53 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
250. it re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 946-953 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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distinguish Holyfield, and its holding. 25 ' Further, the dissent rejected
the existing Indian family exception advocated by the concurring
justice.252 In sum, the dissent argued that, "[u]nfortunately, the
majority has devised a strategy, albeit ' legally
unsupportable, to
' 3
circumvent the requirements of the ICWA. 21
The dissent first chastised the majority for failing to "address,
consider, or resolve" the primary issue raised by the parties and ruled
upon by the appellate court: 254 whether Illinois should adopt the
existing Indian family doctrine. 5 Second, the dissent criticized the
majority opinion for raising sua sponte, without argument or briefing
by the parties, the issue of whether ICWA could be circumvented by
2
state domicile law because of an allegation of parental abandonment. 5
This would avoid the true, underlying possible reality of the case "that
there can be significant and possibly irreparable harm that is inflicted
on Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes when Indian
tribes are wrongfully deprived of their rightful jurisdiction to determine
custody disputes involving Indian children. 2 5 7
The dissent indicated that although parts of the majority opinion
were accurate, the opinion "improperly supplement[ed] the record with
matters that [were] unproved. 258 For example, the dissent accused
the majority of "indulging in unsubstantiated attacks upon the character
and morality of Betty Jo [Iron Bear], the children's surviving Indian
parent, 259 when the majority stated that Richard S. died "of a disease
that he contracted from" Iron Bear. 260 The dissent explained that the
briefs by the parties alleged that Richard S. suffered from acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), a disease from which Iron Bear
also suffered; however, nothing in the record verified either the claim
that Richard S. died from AIDS or that he contracted the disease from
Iron Bear. 26' Additionally, the dissent maintained that the record did
not show how many times the children had visited the Fort Peck

25 1. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 952-53 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See supra notes 239-44 and
accompanying text.
253. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 947 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 946 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 946, 948 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 948 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 946 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
259. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
260. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see id. at 938.
261. Id. at 946-47 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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262
Furthermore, although the majority did not
Indian reservation.
acknowledge this fact, it was Iron Bear who alleged that she had
continuing contact with the children2 63 and the Tubridys did
264 not
them.
with
conversations
telephone
repeated
dispute that she had
Another criticism by the dissent is that the majority
"misapprehend[ed] the central focus of ICWA and ignore[d]
Congress' plenary powers to give superior authority to a tribal court to
assert jurisdiction over custody cases involving Native American
Indian children., 265 The dissent discussed the reasons for the
enactment of ICWA.26 6 It relied on the house report drafted about
ICWA in 1978 to show the lack of cultural understanding on the part
of state social workers.2 67 The dissent emphasized the special duty
that the United States has to preserve Indian tribes' autonomy,268
quoting Chief Calvin Isaac, who testified before Congress at ICWA
hearings that "'[c]ulturally, the chances of Indian survival [and the
transmission of tribal heritage] are significantly reduced [when Indian
children are raised] ... in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to
the ways of their People." 269 The dissenting opinion further relied on
the statement of policy and congressional findings included in ICWA
to show that it was Congress' intent to "greatly reduce State
270 The dissent
involvement in Indian child custody disputes ....
domicile law
state
Illinois
to
apply
decision
argued that the majority's
thus contravened ICWA's and Congress' intent to provide consistent

262. Id. at 947 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). The dissent notes that if it were true that Iron
Bear had maintained continuing contact with S.S. and R.S., then their ties to their tribe
were being maintained through these contacts. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 946 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 947-48 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See generally supra Part II.C.1-2
(explaining the reason for the enactment of ICWA and its purpose).
267. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 947 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). The dissent included
a quote from Representative Udall, explaining that information provided at the
congressional hearings indicated that children were ."removed from their parents and
families by State agencies for the most specious of reasons in proceedings foreign to the
Indian parents."' Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 12,532
(1978) (statement of Rep. Udall)). See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
268. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994).
269. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 948 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34 (1989), which quoted from the
transcripts of hearings on ICWA before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs,
95th Cong. 193 (1978)).
270. Id. at 948 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901).
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and uniform Federal standards for this important issue of jurisdiction
concerning its special relationship with Native American tribes."
According to the dissent, the legislative history of ICWA illustrated
that Congress intended the concept of domicile to be a "'well-defined
operating system for effectuating tribal jurisdiction' even in instances
where the Indian children lived a substantial distance from the tribal
reservation and in all likelihood could not have either close, on-going
physical contacts with their tribal relatives, or consistent, in-depth
exposure to and education about their tribal heritage., 272 The dissent
bolstered its conclusion about Congress' intent concerning domicile by
noting that Congress rejected an earlier version of ICWA which would
have required significant contacts between the tribe and a child not
living on the reservation before the tribal court could obtain jurisdiction
over a proceeding in which the child was a subject. 273 The dissent
reasoned that because Congress had considered and rejected this
concept of a significant contacts doctrine, then it did not intend to limit
ICWA by a doctrine that would require an Indian child, in order to take
the domicile of his surviving parent, to have these significant contacts;
yet, this is quite similar to the result of the majority's decision.274
According to the dissenting opinion, the majority's use of Illinois
state law to determine the domiciles of S.S. and R.S. based upon
whether their mother had abandoned them conflicted with the United
States Supreme Court decision in Holyfield.2 The dissent in In re
S.S. characterized Holyfield as standing for the idea that a parent's
actions cannot alter tribal court power to assert jurisdiction over a
custody proceeding involving an Indian child; thus, parental actions
amounting to abandonment do not and cannot divest a tribal court of
jurisdiction.276 Consequently, in a determination of domicile under
ICWA, "courts must look to uniform, Federal jurisprudence with
respect to this term, and . . . courts cannot apply an inconsistent
27 1. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See generally supra text accompanying notes
25-48, 61-69 (discussing the historical and legislative relationships between the United
States and Native American tribes).
272. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d. at 951 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting 1976
REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION, reprinted in S. REP. No. 95-597, at
51-52 (1977)).
273. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing S. 1214, 95th Cong. § 102(c) (1977),
reprinted in S. REP. No. 95-597, at 4 (1977)).
274. Id. at 952 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 949-50 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See supra notes 148-50 and
accompanying text.
276. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 949 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see supra notes 15860 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of domicile that might vary from State to State. ' 2 "
Basically, the dissent noted that the majority recognized that the
holding of Holyfield and the rules of domicile under established
common law could mean that the legal domicile of the children was
that of their surviving parent, their mother, and the reservation; 78 but,
the court declined to act upon this rule. 279 Further discussion by the
dissent noted that, although the United States Supreme Court in
Holyfield reversed the Mississippi state court because that state court
applied state abandonment law in order to prevent tribal jurisdiction of
a child custody proceeding, the Illinois majority court in In re28S.S.
0
reasoned and ruled in the same way as the Mississippi state court.
The In re S.S. dissent also attacked the majority's holding on
technical grounds.28' Primarily, the majority decision troubled the
dissenting judge because it allowed for two decisions of whether Iron
Bear had abandoned her children.282 First, the domicile hearing would
consider the issue of abandonment, and, second, a parental fitness
hearing as part of a termination of parental rights proceeding would
consider the issue of abandonment. 83 As a result, standard of proof
questions would remain for the domicile-abandonment hearing because
the standard in a parental rights termination is beyond reasonable doubt
under ICWA, while the standard is by clear and convincing evidence
under Illinois law.284
The dissent argued that the majority favored state court jurisdiction
as the outcome of the abandonment proceeding by holding that there
was good cause not to transfer the case to the tribal court under the
277. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 949 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Moreover, the majority recognized that
according to these established rules of common law, when Richard S. died, the domicile
of the children followed that of their mother. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 949. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing People ex rel. Noonan v.
Wingate, 33 N.E.2d 467 (II1. 1941) (holding that at common law an infant took the
domicile of its mother upon the death of the father)). See also 25 AM. JUR. 2D Donicil §
46 (1996) (stating that upon the death of the parent to whom custody of a child has been
awarded, the domicile of the child becomes that of the surviving parent); 25 AM. JUR. 2D
Domicil § 49 (1996) (stating that upon the death of the father, the domicile of the minor
becomes the domicile of the mother); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22,
cmt. d (1971) (stating that upon the death of the parent who has been awarded legal
custody of the child or with whom the child has been living, the child's domicile shifts
to that of the other parent even though the latter is domiciled in another state).
280. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 950 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 951 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
283. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
284. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 100, 19194.
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concurrent but presumptive jurisdiction provision of ICWA. 28s The
dissent opined that "[t]he majority's ruling in this regard is particularly
inappropriate and disturbing ' 286 because the parties have not had the
opportunity to argue this issue.287 The majority determined that there
is good cause not to transfer the proceeding to the tribal court without
any hearing or evidence with respect to that issue.288 The question of
good cause, the dissent emphasized, does not arise until after the court
decides the issue of the children's domiciles.2 8 9 The dissent
'2
characterized the majority's finding of good cause as "premature. 1
Lastly, the dissent addressed the issue that was the concern of the
concurring opinion but which was omitted from the majority opinion:
the existing Indian family exception.2 9 ' The dissent rejected any
application of the exception because the exception is a judicially created
doctrine founded on the belief that references in ICWA to the removal
of Indian children from their families ignores the underlying purpose
of ICWA unless there is an existing Indian family from which a child
custody proceeding might remove an Indian child.292 The dissent
rejected the application of this doctrine because no provision in ICWA
requires its implementation, regardless of whether one believes such a
provision should have been included, 293 and because the doctrine
contains the potential for abuse in situations in which a state court
distrusts "the tribal court's ability to properly consider the 'best
interests' of the child. 2 94 The dissent explained that the belief that a
tribal court would be more likely to ignore a child's best interests is
grounded merely in suspicion.295
The notion that Native American tribal courts are more likely
than state courts to neglect or inflict suffering on Native
American children is grounded in suspicion, not in objective
evidence. [With regard to the twin children whose adoption was
at issue in Holyfield], the tribal court confirmed the placement
285. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 952 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting).
286. Id. (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
287. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
289. Id. (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
290. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
292. Id. at 952 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 953 (McMorrow, J.,dissenting). "'No amount of probing into what
Congress 'intended' can alter what Congress said."' Id. (McMorrow, J.,dissenting)
(quoting In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 100 (S.D. 1991) (Sabers, J., specially concurring)
(emphasis omitted)).
294. Id. (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
295. Id. (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
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of [the] ... twins with a nontribal family [as did the tribal court
which decided the adoption petition with respect to the Indian
child in In re Adoption of Halloway, (Utah 1986), 732 P.2d
962]. Moreover, the assumption that tragic outcomes will more
likely occur when jurisdiction lies with tribal courts rather than
with state courts bespeaks a blindness both to the values and to
the level of efficiency attained by the Euro-American child
welfare system.2 96

In conclusion, the dissent reminded the majority that the Supreme
Court of Illinois was called upon to decide the question of legal
jurisdiction-whether the tribal court or the state court is the proper
jurisdiction 297 for a decision on the adoption issues at stake-and not
the ultimate issues of placement, parental rights termination, and
adoption.298 The dissent ultimately stated it would have affirmed the
appellate court ruling,299 finding the tribal court to have exclusive
jurisdiction under ICWA because the children were domiciliaries of the
Native American tribal reservation.3"
IV. ANALYSIS

The majority in In re S.S. narrowly analyzed the issue, which
stripped the Fort Peck Indian tribe of its power and autonomy to
decide this case through its tribal court and its system of law. 3 '
Consequently, the majority refused to grant the tribe federally required
exclusive jurisdiction over the case and improperly prevented the
possibility of transfer to the tribal court according to presumptive
jurisdiction.3 °2 As such, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the
296. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing
the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L.
REV. 585, 629 (1994)).
297. Even this slightly misstates the issue, however, because the more precise
question was whether the tribal court had exclusive or concurrent but presumptive
jurisdiction. Id. at 953 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Even if the court found the latter to
be true, it was not called upon to decide whether to transfer the case pursuant to such
concurrent but presumptive jurisdiction. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
298. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
299. In re S.S., 622 N.E.2d 832 (I11.App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 657 N.E.2d 935 (111.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
300. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 953 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); see 25 U.S.C. §
191 1(a) (1994).
301. See In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 946 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See generally
supra note 139 and accompanying text (explaining that autonomous power is necessary
for the survival of an Indian tribe).
302. See In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 952 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). But see supra
notes 275-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court approach as
contrary to that of the United States Supreme Court).
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tribe's interest in the welfare of its children members, S.S. and R.S.;
the fundamental rights of its member and reservation resident, Betty Jo
Iron Bear; the survival of the tribal community as a whole; and any
power or autonomy that the tribe perhaps had over these interests.3" 3
The court accomplished this by proffering an unpersuasive rationale
30 4
for circumventing United States Supreme Court precedent,
supporting flawed reasoning in an analysis of the general principles of
the law of domicile, 30 5 and improperly considering the issue of
whether there existed good cause to transfer the case from state court
to tribal court.3°6
A. An UnconvincingAttempt to Distinguish United States Supreme
Court Precedent
At a basic level, the Holyfield Court already considered the issue of
In re S.S.-the issue of whether the court may apply state law to
define domicile under ICWA. The Court unequivocally rejected such
an application of state law.30 7 The Illinois court provides no new
support or reasoning on this issue, and thus, offers an unconvincing
argument that deviates from United States Supreme Court precedent.
The In re S.S. court's attempt to distinguish Holyfield was not
convincing because the two cases are neither distinguishable according
to their facts nor distinguishable according to their reasoning. In both
cases, ICWA applied to two siblings who were subject children of
adoption petitions and were Indian children as defined by the Act.30 8
The children in Holyfield were Native American children, and both of
their parents were enrolled members of the tribe.30 9 The children in
S.S. were also enrolled members of the tribe.310 Additionally, neither
the children in Holyfield nor the children in S.S. lived on the
reservation of their tribes, although in both cases the children's Indian
parents did. 31 ' Finally, neither set of parents was married.31 2 In both
303. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53 (1989);
see supra notes 66, 139, 159, 173.
304. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
305. See infra text accompanying notes 357-69.
306. See supra Part III.B.
307. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45-47, 54.
308. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1994).
309. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37.
310. In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 938 (II. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
31 1. Id. at 938. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 131.
312. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 131. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 938. See supra Part III.A.
for a discussion of the facts of In re SS, and supra text accompanying notes 131-36 for a
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cases, the issue addressed by the court was whether the children's
Native American parents' actions were determinative of the children's
domicile, which, in turn, was determinative of jurisdiction of the
13

case.

3

The factual differences asserted by the Illinois court were few.
Primarily, the Illinois court focused on the fact that, in Holyfield, the
parents schemed to "abandon" their children by signing voluntary
consents to the termination of their parental rights for the adoption of
the children by non-Indians and thus avoided tribal court jurisdiction
over the adoption.3t 4 In In re S.S., however, the children's mother
had not schemed to "facilitate adoption of [her] children by nonIndians while they remain domiciliaries of the reservation. 3t5 Only if
this "scheme" were present, the court reasoned, would the use of state
abandonment law contravene any purpose of ICWA because of the
resultant weakening of the tribe's ability to assert its interest in its
children.3t 6
The court's reasoning is faulty, because the existence of the parents'
"scheme" was not the only factor in the Holyfield decision. 3 7 A
crucial element of Holyfield was the fact that the application of state
abandonment law, whether due to voluntary parental consent, parental
scheming, or otherwise, did not consider the interest of the tribe itself;
thus, state law undermined Congress' intent in enacting ICWA. 3 18 In
other words, a tribe's opportunity to obtain jurisdiction was weaker
because of the application of state abandonment law whether or not the
parents or the state "schemed" to avoid the tribal jurisdiction." 9 For
example, there could be a situation in which Native American parents
acted in a way that they did not perceive as abandonment of their child,
e.g., placement of the child with relatives in another state and
subsequent financial setbacks or illness precluding visits with the child
for an extended period of time; yet, the state court could apply state
law and rule that the parents had abandoned the child, perhaps
divesting the tribe of its jurisdiction. 320 The outcome of this
discussion of the facts of Holyfield.
313. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 30-54; In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 935-43.
314. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 942 (citing Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 40).
315. See id.
316. Id.
317. See id. at 950 (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
318. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49.
319. See generally supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the importance of the core
jurisdiction provisions of ICWA in the context of ICWA's general purpose).
320. See generally supra notes 21-22 (explaining Native American cultural identity
as one of tribal unity in which extended families play an important role).
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hypothetical situation would be exactly the same as in the Holyfield
situation in which the parents similarly consented to the
"abandonment" of their child. In In re S.S., Iron Bear, to whom that
hypothetical situation
might apply, tried not to avoid tribal jurisdiction,
32 1
it.
safeguard
but to
Any action by parents, then, if it triggers state law application,
necessarily results in a weakening of the tribe's interest, and the Court
considered this consequence when it decided Holyfield. 2 After
explaining that the lower court state definition of domicile was not
what Congress intended in ICWA, the Holyfield Court stated, "[n]or
can the result be any different simply because the twins were
'voluntarily surrendered' by their mother. .Tribal jurisdiction under §
1911 (a) [exclusive jurisdiction provision of ICWA] was not meant to
be defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe. 321 3 The
first sentence indicates that, regardless of the existence of a parental
scheme, the Holyfield analysis applies and holds true.324
The second factual distinction emphasized by the Illinois court was
that, while both parents in Holyfield resided on the reservation, in In
re S.S., only Iron Bear resided on the reservation, and the children's
father never resided there.3 25 The court explained that this difference
was crucial because it made Illinois the domiciles of S.S. and R.S.
inasmuch as this was the domicile of their father.326 While this was
true during the time the children lived with Richard S., upon his death,
and at the time of the filing of the termination and adoption petitions,
he was not "residing" at all-either on or off the reservation.
Consequently, this factual difference is of little meaning or effect,
except to show that the domiciles of S.S. and R.S. had once been
Illinois.
In addition to the court's unconvincing distinction of facts, there are
some factual nuances in the analysis by the Holyfield Court which, if
properly applied to In re S.S., likely would require that the domicile of
the children follow that of their mother, Iron Bear. Consideration of
the same factual difference on which the Illinois court relied to
321. See In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 938 (Iron Bear attempted to safeguard tribal
jurisdiction by filing a motion to transfer the case to tribal court).
322. See Holyfleld, 490 U.S. at 49.
323. Id.
324. Thus, the In re S.S. court's emphasis on the existence of a parental scheme to
avoid tribal jurisdiction was a weak argument by which to distinguish Holyfield. See
supra text accompanying notes 310, 312.
325. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 941.
326. Id.
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distinguish its case, could have reached a contrary result. 327 In
Holyfield, even though the parents tried to avoid tribal jurisdiction, the
Court still validated the tribe's jurisdictional interest.3 28 In In re S.S.,
in contrast, Iron Bear did not want to avoid tribal jurisdiction; she filed
a motion to transfer the case to the tribal court.3 29 Her interest was
thus stronger than that of the birth parents in Holyfield. Even though
she was working toward the goal of tribal jurisdiction like the tribe and
ICWA, the Illinois court virtually denied the Native American Iron
Bear, S.S. and R.S., their extended Indian family members, and the
tribe access to that goal. It is not evident or likely that Iron Bear
intended or wanted to "abandon" her children. In fact, she claimed
that her revocation of visitation rights with them was obtained by
Richard S. by default. 330 Furthermore, Iron Bear was contesting, or at
"'
least not consenting to, the termination of her parental rights.33
An additional fact supporting tribal jurisdiction in In re S.S. is that
in Holyfield, the children lived for three years with their adoptive
parents; yet, the Court mandated exclusive tribal jurisdiction and risked
that the tribe would remove the children to place them with Native
Americans.332 The Court, therefore, trusted and respected the tribe's
autonomy to decide the situation justly and fairly.333 In re S.S. was an
ideal case in which Illinois had the opportunity to trust and respect a
tribe's ability to act justly and fairly. Because Iron Bear's rights were
at stake, her interest in tribal jurisdiction was much stronger than that
of the parents in Holyfield.334 ICWA was, in part, enacted for the
protection of Native American parents and families, with whom Iron
Bear, as the mother of S.S. and R.S, is included.335 Just as parents
are entitled to the assistance and support of state laws in order to

327. The difference is the voluntariness of the "abandonment" and resulting
avoidance of tribal jurisdiction.
328. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53 (1989).
329. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 938.
330. Id.
33 1. Telephone Interview with Kathryn McGowan Bettcher, Attorney, Prairie State
Legal Services (Nov. 1, 1996). Ms. Bettcher was the attorney for Iron Bear in this case.
In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 937. Also, the fact that these issues are in court shows Iron
Bear's resistance to the termination of her parental rights.
332. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53-54.
333. Id. at 54 (explaining that the Court will defer to the experience, wisdom and
compassion of the tribal court).
334. In re S.S. concerns an attempt to involuntarily terminate Iron Bear's parental
rights over her children, whereas Holyfield concerns parents' voluntarily surrender of
their parental rights over their children.
335. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
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safeguard their parental rights, Iron Bear should similarly have had the
opportunity to receive the support of her tribe's system of justice.336
In addition to trying to distinguish Holyfield according to its facts,
the In re S.S. majority tried to distinguish Holyfield according to its
reasoning.337 The Illinois majority reasoned that its decision did not
undermine the purpose of ICWA or the tribe's ability to assert its
interest in its children.338 The court, however, was incorrect. Not
only was the tribe's ability to assert its interest in its children weakened
by the application of state abandonment law, it was all but crippled.339
The use of state abandonment law contravenes not only the language
of ICWA, but also its purpose. First, ICWA does not anywhere
express that a state should use abandonment law to determine
domicile. 340 As the Supreme Court notes, there is a "general
assumption that 'in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary,..
. Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the
federal act dependent on state law.' ' 34 1 Congress could have included
such a requirement in ICWA had it intended that interpretation of
domicile, but instead Congress remained silent on the definition of
domicile.342
A federal perspective on the definition of domicile provided by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) guidelines explained that Congress
intentionally did not include definitions of residence or domicile
because these "terms are well defined under existing state law. There
is no indication that these state law definitions tend to undermine in
336. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); supra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text.
337. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 942.
338. Id.
339. The decision cripples the tribe's interest because it interjects a second
possibility (with good cause not to transfer pursuant to presumptive jurisdiction as the
first possibility) that the state will retain jurisdiction even if the tribe would have had
exclusive jurisdiction but for the "abandonment." See supra Part II.C.3.
340. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 n.22
(1989).
341. Id. at 43 (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)).
342. Id. at 47 n.22. See In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 950. The dissent of In re S.S.
quotes:
There certainly is nothing in ICWA or its legislative history to suggest that
state law controls if, in application, its subtleties bring it into conflict with
ICWA in ways that Congress apparently did not foresee. Under general
supremacy principles, state law cannot be permitted to operate 'as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.
Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 967 (Utah 1986) (citation
omitted)).
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any way the purpose of the Act. 3 43 The guidelines indicate that if
there were an indication that state law definitions tended to undermine
the purpose of ICWA, then those definitions of domicile would not be
acceptable. 3 " In In re S.S., the state definition of domicile does
undermine ICWA and thus should not be applied. While the BIA
guidelines are not binding on state courts, Holyfield is and held that,
indeed, the application of state abandonment law to a decision of
domicile thwarted the purpose of ICWA.34 5
Further, Congress intended ICWA to provide federal, and thus
uniform, standards for these categories of proceedings. 346 Application
of state abandonment laws in order to decide the most fundamental
tenets of ICWA, domicile and jurisdiction, results in varying outcomes
from state to state. 347 This confusion and lack of fairness to those in
similar situations was not what Congress intended under ICWA. 348
An application of state abandonment law to a determination of
domicile under ICWA frustrates the purposes of ICWA in a few ways.
First, it significantly weakens the tribal interest. The tribal interest is
all but equated with tribal jurisdiction.3 4 9 Although there is more to the
tribal interest in child custody proceedings than just jurisdiction, the
issue of jurisdiction is at the core. 35° Tribal jurisdiction is
representative of the restitution that the United States decided to make
to Native American tribes throughout the past twenty-five years.35 '
Instead of stripping Native Americans of their power, culture,
heritage, children, and thus their future, Congress provided Indians
with important tools via ICWA and its jurisdictional provisions.352
Consequently, so drastically lessening the tribe's opportunity to obtain
jurisdiction, as the Illinois court did, surely contravenes Congress'
intent to increase tribal autonomy.353 To illustrate its intent, Congress
stated within ICWA that there exists the "special relationship between

343. 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,585 (1979) (not codified).
344. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 51 n.26.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 135-47.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48, 157-59.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 135-47.
348. See supra note 149.
349. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 51 (quoting Inre Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962,
969-70).
350. See generally Part 11.C.4 (discussing ICWA protections afforded to parties and
tribes in child custody proceedings).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
352. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
353. See supra text accompanying notes 344-45.
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the United States and the Indian tribes and their members and the
Federal responsibility to Indian people... "1354
Second, the application of state abandonment law frustrates ICWA's
purpose because it creates a loophole to exclusive jurisdiction. The
majority decision of In re S.S. provides the state with greater control
over Indian children and families. Congress, however, had explained
clearly, both in ICWA and repeatedly in its legislative history, that it
intended to reduce involvement and control of the state in Indian child
custody proceedings. 5 Quoting a case, ICWA's legislative history
notes that "[b]y using the Indian child's domicile as the State's
jurisdictional basis, the Indian tribe is afforded significant protection
from losing its essential rights of childrearing and maintenance of tribal
'
identity." 356
By reversing the power structure inherent in the
jurisdiction provisions, especially the exclusive jurisdiction provision,
that ICWA was intended to create, the court has returned to the pre1978 lack of respect for Indian autonomy and culture that predated the
enactment of ICWA.357
B. The Flawed MajorityAnalysis of Domicile Law
When the Tubridys filed their appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,
they did not argue that the tribe lacked exclusive jurisdiction because
Iron Bear had abandoned S.S. and R.S. 358 The appellate court had not
even considered this issue, but only domicile generally. 35 9 The
Tubridys alleged that Iron Bear had abandoned S.S. and R.S. and was
354. 25 U.S.C. § 1901. See also In re S.S. & R.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 948 (Il1. 1995)
(McMorrow, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996). 'The majority refuses
to confront and grapple with the reality that there can be significant and possibly
irreparable harm that is inflicted on Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes
when Indian tribes are wrongfully deprived of their rightful jurisdiction to determine
custody disputes involving Indian children." Id. (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
355. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5).
"[T]hat the States, exercising their recognized
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial
bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and
the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families." Id. See
also In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 948 (recognizing cultural harm where Indian tribes are
denied the right to decide custodial issues).
356. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7537 (quoting Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 228, 238 (Md. 1975)).
357. See also In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 946 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority's opinion as having the "unfortunate effect of . . . revert[ing] to and
perpetuat[ing] the regressive State policies and practices that led Congress to enact
ICWA"). Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 938.
359. In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 622 N.E.2d 832, 841-43 (111.
App. Ct. 1993),
rev'd, 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
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therefore an unfit parent whose parental rights should be terminated to
allow for the adoption of the children, but the two contexts of
exclusive jurisdiction and parental fitness are not directly analogous
backdrops for the issue of abandonment.
The court incorrectly defined domicile in the context of ICWA. The
Holyfield rule of interpretation of domicile under the Act is that the
court may rely on general principles of domicile to the extent that those
principles do not contradict Congress' intent. 36' The In re S.S. court
ventured past this limit in its decision when it employed an exception
to the general rules of domicile. It was this narrow exception, not the
3 62
general principles of domicile, which thwarted Congress' intent.
Had the Illinois court applied the acceptable general principles of
domicile, then the mother's domicile would have dictated the
children's as the reservation, and the tribal court would have had its
rightful exclusive jurisdiction.363
Even with the application of the abandonment law exception,
however, the outcome of the case was not compulsory. 364 The court,
relying upon common law and the Restatements (Second) of the
Conflict of Laws, defined domicile for the children as "upon the death
of the father [a child] took the domicile of its mother., 365 The court
further defined domicile as "upon the death of the parent who has been
awarded legal custody of the child or with whom the child has been
living, the child's domicile shifts to the other parent even though the
latter is domiciled in another state. 366 The abandonment exception
provides that:
[I]f the child is abandoned by . . . a surviving parent, and no

guardian of the child's person is appointed, the child should
acquire a domicil at the home of a grandparent or other person
who stands in loco parentis to him and with whom he lives....
Absent some compelling reason to the contrary, the child's
domicil should be in the place to which he is most closely
related.367
Assuming the court insisted upon applying this exception but had
been more willing to give full effect to Holyfield and ICWA, it might
See In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 938.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1989).
See supra Parts II.C.I-3.
See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48-49.
364. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 946 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (focusing on the
majority's misapplication of the principles of ICWA).
365. Id. at 942 (citing People ex rel. Noonan v. Wingate, 33 N.E.2d 467 (Il1. 1941)).
366. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 cmt. b (1971)).
367. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 cmt. i (1971)).
360.
361.
362.
363.
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have found that the purposes of ICWA were compelling reasons for
the children's domiciles to follow their mother's. 3 6 Further, the court
also could have considered the fact that the tribal court was considered
a separate legal system. 369 Thus, the Restatement's suggestion that
"[g]enerally speaking . . . [i]n other legal systems, the concept [of
domicile] may be given a somewhat different meaning""37 would allow
the court to find that the children had their mother's domicile.
Thus, the court's remand of In re S.S. to ascertain whether
abandonment had occurred was unnecessary. Further support for this
position is that Holyfield directly addressed the issue of abandonment
in the context of domicile under ICWA, stating, "[t]here is some
authority for the proposition that abandonment can effectuate a change
in the child's domicile, In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P. 2d, at
967, although this may not be the majority rule." 371' The Court,
however, implicitly rejected the possibility that abandonment could
change a child's domicile when it refused to apply state abandonment
law in Holyfield even though the children had clearly been
"abandoned.372
C. The Creationof ProceduralProblems
The majority's decision has a procedurally confusing outcome.
"[T]he majority essentially holds that [Iron Bear's] alleged
abandonment of the children may be considered twice-once in the
context of a domicile hearing, and a second time in the context of a
fitness hearing. 373 This outcome creates not only an inefficiency in its
redundancy, but also an inconsistency in its standards.374
Presumably, the court would first consider Iron Bear's possible
abandonment in the context of a hearing in which the children's
domicile was at issue in order to determine whether the tribal or state
court would have jurisdiction. 375 After that hearing, and regardless of
368. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
369. Indian tribes are authorized to establish their own courts and to adopt their own
laws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. PEVAR, supra note 25, at
97.
370. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13 cmt. a (1971).
371. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 51 n.26
(1989).
372. Id.
373. In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 951 (I1l. 1995) (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
374. See id. at 951 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (characterizing the procedural course
as "unwarranted, cumbersome, and illogical ... .
375. Id. at 943.

1997]

In re S.S. and R.S.

885

the outcome of the jurisdiction question, a termination of parental
rights proceeding would again address the issue of Iron Bear's
abandonment because the Tubridys argue that Iron Bear is an unfit
parent due to her alleged abandonment of her children.376 In the
jurisdictional hearing, the forum is necessarily state court, and the
standard of proof would require clear and convincing 377 evidence of
abandonment, as understood by non-Indians."8
In contrast, the termination of parental rights hearing would proceed
under ICWA regardless of jurisdiction,"7 and the standard of proof to
terminate parental rights would require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.380 Of course, one possible resolution of this potential conflict
would be to implement the higher standard of proof in the domicileabandonment hearing. The In re S.S. majority is silent on the issue of
standard of proof in the hearings and does not specify whether to use
the two different standards or to apply a higher one.38' In addition,
upon the transfer of the proceedings to the tribal court, the subsequent
determination of the children's best interests, as construed by the tribal
court vis-A-vis Native American values, could conflict with the state
court's Anglo-American interpretation of the children's best interests.
ICWA does not support this double abandonment hearing
outcome.382 In fact, this double abandonment hearing precisely defies
the holding and reasoning of Holyfield, in which the United States
Supreme Court reiterated Congress' desire for uniformity of
application of ICWA, particularly with respect to the concept of
domicile.383
D. Improper Considerationof Good Cause
The Illinois Supreme Court further held that, if the lower court were
to find on remand that Iron Bear had abandoned the children, thereby
divesting the tribal court of exclusive jurisdiction, then there was good
376. Id. at 951 (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
377. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (explaining that the standard of proof under
Illinois law is clear and convincing).
378. See supra note 68. "The substantive provisions of the Act also demonstrate that
its best interest approach is different." Dale, supra note 68, at 372.
379. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(1), 1911 (1994).
380. Id. § 1912(f).
381. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 951 (McMorrow, J.,dissenting).
382. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). "There is nothing in the ICWA that
demonstrates congressional intent to allow abandonment to be litigated on two separate
occasions during the course of the proceeding, or to allow two different burdens of proof
to apply to these proceedings." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
383. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 (1989).
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cause to reject the presumption that the state court should transfer the
case to the tribal court. 4 This decision was inappropriate. This was
a "particularly ... disturbing" 38 5 and "premature ' 386 decision for the
Supreme Court of Illinois to make during the interlocutory appeal.
Instead, it is a decision that the trial court should make, if and when
concurrent jurisdiction is obtained. 7
The court's willingness to rule on this "good cause" issue sua
sponte without allowing the parties the opportunity to brief or argue it
on the merits demonstrated what may be an underlying motivation of
the decision: mistrust.388 For example, the court may have harbored
concerns about the "best interest" dichotomy and feared that its
definition of a child's best interest would not be applied by a tribal
court.8 9 In other words, the state court may have feared that the tribal
court would automatically preserve the parental rights of Iron Bear if
the tribal court obtained jurisdiction over the case.39 It follows, then,
that the court perhaps assumed that the tribal court would place the
children with Iron Bear even though the children had only sporadic
contact with her.39'
The majority decision evidenced an intent to retain jurisdiction of
this case at all Costs. 392 It hinted to the lower court that a finding of
abandonment by Iron Bear would be the proper outcome, and it
decided the direction of possible concurrent jurisdiction.393 The
Illinois Supreme Court seemed to slant the facts to weigh in favor of
an abandonment finding. Some of these facts, the dissent noted, are in
384. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 943.
385. Id. at 952 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
386. Id. (McMorrow, J. dissenting).
387. See id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 953 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (rejecting the existing Indian family
exception because of abuse by state courts that mistrust tribal courts' abilities to decide a
child's best interest) (citing Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American:
Culture, Jurisdiction & the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REv. 585, 629 (1994)).
389. Id. See supra note 68 and accompanying text, and notes 188-90.
390. See also In re S.S., 622 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that the
Tubridys' argument reflected the assumption that if the case were decided by the tribal
court, Iron Bear would prevail), rev'd, 657 N.E.2d 935 (III. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1320 (1996).
391. Id. The court reasoned, "we have no reason to doubt that if the case is
transferred, the tribal court will decide it fairly." Id. The court noted, however, that its
purpose was not to predict outcomes, but rather to decide who ultimately should hear the
case. Id.
392. See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
393. These undisguised "hints" are seen in the majority's recitation of facts and in its
statement that "good cause" did not exist to transfer decision. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at
938, 943. See supra notes 258-64, 285-89 and accompanying text.
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question, yet the majority stated them as true.3 94 Examples are that the
children have "visited the Fort Peck reservation only once" 395 and that
"neither child has had any significant interaction with an Indian tribe
beyond their one visit to the reservation., 39 1 While these facts may go
to the question of abandonment, or even to the existing Indian family
doctrine under state law, they should not be relevant to the question of
domicile and jurisdiction under ICWA.
The court's mistrust of the tribal role was not blatant, yet no other
reason likely exists for the court's eagerness to try so zealously to
prevent tribal court jurisdiction over the case. 397 The court was surely
well-meaning in its approach and sought to safeguard the best interests
of S.S. and R.S. 398 The court neglected to recognize, however, that
its state law concept of best interest of the child does not necessarily
coincide with the standards under ICWA, including ICWA's "best
interest of the child" standard. 399 Because of the important ICWA
policies of respect toward the unique political and cultural place of
Native Americans in our society, the court should have followed the
suggestion of the Holyfield court and "'defer[red] to the experience,
wisdom and compassion of the ...tribal courts'"4° for an appropriate
decision.4 '
394. See supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
395. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 938.
396. Id.
397. In the opinion of one commentator, state courts fear the discretion of tribal
courts for the following reasons:
When refusing jurisdictional transfer under the guise of protecting the Indian
child's best interests, state courts seem to be acting out of fear that the tribal
courts might decide a case differently than state courts and thus harm the Indian
child's best interests. To deal with that fear, state courts simply deny tribal
courts of the opportunity to hear the case. Such denials are contrary to
ICWA's goals, one of which is to allow tribal courts to adjudicate custody
matters involving member children.
Michael E. Connelly, Tribal Jurisdiction Under Section 1911(b) of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1878: Are the States Respecting Indian Sovereignty? 23 N.M. L. REV.
479, 495 (Spring 1993) (citing e.g., Lisa Driscoll, Tribal Courts: New Mexico's Third
Judiciary, 32 N.M. BAR BULL. 7 (Feb. 18, 1993) at 7 ("[Tribal courts are underused or
misused. [State courts and non-Indian practitioners] cannot develop respect for a system
they fear .... ) (quoting Catherine Baker Stetson, Preface to TRIBAL COURT HANDBOOK
(1990))).
398. "It was this same well-meaning but debilitating paternalism which ICWA
sought to prevent." Connelly, supra note 397, at 494.
399. See supra notes 187-89.
400. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 953 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (quoting Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989) (citing In re Adoption of
Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986))).
401. This is an example of an analysis that mixes jurisdictional and substantive
issues which "obviate[s] any tribal participation, in clear contravention of the federal
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E. ConcurringOpinion

The concurring opinion offered little to the analysis of jurisdiction
based on domicile under ICWA. Instead, it focused solely on the
existing Indian family exception and advocated for its application in
Illinois.0 2 In concurring, Justice Heiple attempted to distinguish
Holyfield for the same reasons as the majority in order to show that
Holyfield does not preclude the existing Indian family exception.4 3
The opinion stated, "Specifically, the dissent opines that Holyfield
stands for the proposition that the ICWA grants the tribes an interest in
children separate from that of the children's parents and thus that the
existing Indian family exception is improper because it ignores the
tribe's interest. This, however, overstates the case."4 It is unclear
which proposition "overstates the case." If Justice Heiple meant that
reading Holyfield as precluding the existing Indian family exception
overstated the case, he has a semantic argument because the case does
not expressly deal with that doctrine by name. If, however, Justice
Heiple meant that both propositions are an overstatement of the case,
then he weakens his criticism because Holyfield clearly and explicitly
grants tribes an interest in Indian children separate from that of Indian
parents.40 5
The concurring opinion further argued that the tribe's interest under
ICWA is limited to obtaining exclusive jurisdiction in particular cases
and to assuring the placement of Indian children with extended family
members or other Indian families. 4 6 Thus, the concurring opinion
argued that the existing Indian family exception does not ignore the
tribal interest. 40 7 When applied to concurrent jurisdiction under

ICWA, however, this argument fails to encompass both a tribe's
separate interest in concurrent presumptive jurisdiction and placement
preference because it argues for restraint of application of the Act
altogether in many cases involving Indian children. 408

policy of tribal preference." See Connelly, supra note 397, at 493-94 n.1 10.
402. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 943-45 (Heiple, J., concurring).
403. Id. (Heiple, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying notes 238-47.
404. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 943-45 (Heiple, J., concurring).
405. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989).
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(3), 1902.
406. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 945 (Heiple, J., concurring).
407. Id. (Heiple, J., concurring).
408. Refusal to apply ICWA of course eliminates its placement preferences for Native
American children, thus eliminating one of the forms of ensuring ties between tribe and
children and of perpetuating the tribe's culture and survival. See supra notes 104-08 and
accompanying text.
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In his denial of any implication that advocating for the existing
Indian family exception or abandonment hearings indicated a distrust
of or prejudice against the tribal court, Justice Heiple argued that even
ifpresent, such distrust or prejudice would be "beside the point. ,,409
Distrust of and prejudice against Indian tribes and their autonomous
power, however, are precisely what ICWA was intended to
safeguard.4 '0 The presence of this prejudice or distrust is certainly not
beside the point and any ICWA analysis needs to address their
possible presence.
Justice Heiple's transparent statement of denial of prejudice against
or distrust of the tribal court implicitly emphasizes the state law's
concept of children's best interests:
Illinois has a complex set of statutes designed to ensure the best
interests of its citizens, including children in situations such as
S.S. and R.S. This court is familiar with and regularly called
upon to interpret these statutes which are rooted in the common
law and have withstood the test of time. My desire to apply
Illinois law if possible stems from my confidence in these laws,
1
all of4 1which
aim to achieve what is in the best interest of S.S. and
R.S.

Justice Heiple's emphasis on the best interests of the children is
ironic. In S.S., the state concept of the best interest of the child may
not coincide with ICWA's idea of the best interest of the child, which
presumes that it is in the best interest for the child to maintain ties with
the tribe.4 1 2 Consequently, application of the Illinois doctrine could
possibly cause harm to S.S. and R.S. because it does not account for
cultural ties between the children and their tribe.
As the author of the highly controversial and criticized "Baby
Richard" case only one year prior, Justice Heiple had extensive
experience with the application of Illinois' "best interest of the child"
standard of law.4 13 In that case, Justice Heiple refused to apply the
"best interest of the child" doctrine to a situation in which a birth parent
was not first found unfit. 4 14 As a result, the court removed the child
from his adoptive home after he lived there from infancy to

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
(1994).
414.

In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 945 (Heiple, J.,concurring).
See supra note 68; see generally Part HI.C.2 (explaining ICWA's purpose).
In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 945 (Heiple, J., concurring).
See supra notes 186-90.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 499
In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (I11.
Id. at 182.
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approximately age three4"' and a public outcry ensued.4 ' 6 Here,
Justice Heiple takes care to apply and extol the Illinois "best interest of
the child" doctrine, even though it may, in fact, have some negative
impact on the children in this particular case. Unlike Baby Richard,
however, S.S. and R.S., were not living and had not lived with the
Tubridys, who were trying to adopt them.41 7 Thus, the "Baby
Richard" outrage may have prompted the concurring justice to focus
on the individual rights of S.S. and R.S. with no consideration of their
interest as members of their tribe or as in need of tribal court cultural
understanding and protection of their ties to Iron Bear. 8
V.

IMPACT

In re S.S. is representative of a trend in state courts to ignore the
"spirit" of ICWA, an act many courts have forgotten or ignored" 9
through manipulation and circumvention of ICWA provisions.
Although there are several established ways in which state courts have
e
had problems applying the Act's provisions, 420 In re S.S. ad
adds a new
method to the list, even in the face of Supreme Court precedent
indicating disapproval of this addition of the use of state abandonment
law in the context of ICWA.42 1
When Illinois and other state courts circumvent the requirements of
ICWA, they return to an approach of a bygone era of paternalism and
415. Id.
416. See Bob Greene, Supreme Injustice for a Little Boy, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1994,
Tempo Section, at 1.
417. In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 938.
418. See also Ted Gregory, State Makes History in Custody War, CHI. TRIB., Metro
Northwest, October 20, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6257532 (commenting that the
court took an unusually long time, seventeen months, to decide In re S.S. probably in
order to allow for public criticism of the court to die down in the wake of the "Baby
Richard" case).
419. Christine Metteer, Pigs in Heaven: A Parable of Native American Adoption
Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 590 (Summer 1996).
Metteer's "spirit" of ICWA is likely synonymous with congressional intent.
420. Examples include: the existing Indian family exception whereby the Act does
not apply at all to the child custody proceeding unless the child was living with Native
Americans when removed from the home; the finding of good cause not to transfer a
child custody proceeding to the tribal court pursuant to the concurrent jurisdiction
provisions of ICWA; and refusing to apply the Act's clear child placement preferences
because they would not be in the best interest of the child. See generally Metteer, supra
note 419 (discussing the various ways in which state courts have avoided ICWA
requirements). See supra note 124 (citing cases in which state courts have employed the
existing Indian family exception since Holyfield); supra note 86 (citing cases in which
state courts have refused to transfer jurisdiction of a child custody case to the tribe under
the concurrent jurisdiction provision of ICWA).
421. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 (1989).
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ethnocentric decisions. In other words, by failing to recognize a
uniform definition of domicile, the Illinois Supreme Court in In re
S.S. fails to recognize the special relationship between Congress and
Native American tribes in this country.42 2 The court in its In re S.S.
decision joins the proponents of doctrines such as the existing Indian
family doctrine because it ignores the "spirit 4 23 of the Act. Because
the decision makes it more difficult for a tribe to assert its jurisdictional
interest in the child custody matters of its members, it harks back to the
time of the termination era in the 1950s and 1960s, when most
assertions of tribal self-government were nearly impossible.424
The In re S.S. decision allows state courts to disregard Native
American holistic tribal culture in which extended families play an
important role in raising children. Illinois courts may now act in a
manner similar to other state actors who, prior to ICWA,
inappropriately assumed neglect of a child.425 Consequently, if
parents rely on an extended family member to care for their children
off of the reservation, this decision indicates that the core exclusive
jurisdictional provision of ICWA might not apply because the court
could hold that the parents abandoned the children. Paradoxically, this
may be less likely if the children reside with extended family members
on the reservation on which their parents live, because children's
chances for contact with the parents increase. Through its application
of state abandonment law, then, In re S.S. supports the growth of the
state court trend to circumvent ICWA provisions.
The decision supports the perpetuation of the problem which ICWA
was enacted to resolve. As recently as 1990, the removal of Indian
children from tribal communities had not been ameliorated and
"continue[d] to threaten the vitality of contemporary Indian nations. 426
For example, in 1989 New Mexico state courts ignored the mandates
of ICWA in seventy cases.427 When Congress enacted ICWA, the
422. See supra Part 1.B.
423. Metteer supra note 419, at 590.
424. See PEVAR, supra note 25, at 57.
425. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
426. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 4. See also note 301 and accompanying text
(explaining how the Illinois Supreme Court threatened tribal autonomy with its In re
S.S. decision).
427. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 4. Goldsmith reports that in 1990 "the rate of
placement of Indian children in substitute care was 3.6 times greater than that of their

non-Indian counterparts, reflecting a twenty-five percent increase over six years." Id.
(citing Margaret C. Plantz et al., Indian Child Welfare: A Status Report, Final Report of
the Survey of Indian Child Welfare and Inplementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act
and Section 428 of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, at 3-2

(1988)).
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problem it addressed was the state's control over Native Americans
and their children through child welfare policies and misguided social
workers. 28 Now, the problem may resurface in the form of the state's
control over Native Americans and their children through court
maneuvers and doctrines-which likewise wrests from Indians their
autonomy, their culture, and their assured future tribal existence.
More specifically, the In re S.S. decision creates confusion for
Illinois state courts. For example, the decision does not resolve which
standard of proof should be applied in abandonment-domicile
hearings, or whether it is acceptable to maintain two different
standards of proof on the identical issue for the same person.429
Confusion in the Illinois courts is exacerbated because In re S.S.
was only the fourth case ever in this state concerning ICWA. Two of
the Illinois cases add little to an ICWA analysis because they dealt with
the issue of whether a particular tribe was eligible for ICWA
protections.430 The other case, however, In re Armell, held that a
separate ICWA provision must not be "interpreted by individual state
law. 43 ' It is inconsistent that Illinois law now stands as allowing the
application of its state law when applying one provision of ICWA
(exclusive jurisdiction of tribal court 432) but not when applying another
(good cause to deny transfer to tribal court 43 3 ).
In addition, increased confusion results because In re S.S. does not
specify when, how, and with which standard of proof abandonment
hearings must be held for a determination of domicile pursuant to
ICWA.43 4 Unanswered questions remain: must the court hold this
hearing in every case in which the children do not live with an Indian
parent? Must the court hold the abandonment hearing in every case
governed by ICWA in which children live off of the reservation? Or
would the court hold this abandonment-domicile hearing only in cases
in which abandonment is an alleged reason for the termination of
parental rights?

428. See supra Part 11.B.
429. See supra Part IV.C.
430. In re Adopt T.I.S., 586 N.E.2d 690 (II1. App. Ct. 1991); In re Stiarwalt, 546
N.E.2d 44 (IlL.App. Ct. 1989).
431. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1066 (I11.App. Ct. 1990); Metteer, supra note
419, at 605 (explaining that the Armell decision refused to apply state best interest of
the child law in a decision of whether there was good cause not to transfer under ICWA's
concurrent jurisdiction provision).
432. 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(a) (1994).
433. Id. § 1911(b).
434. See supra text accompanying notes 280-82, 373-81.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Unlike many difficult child placement, custody and adoption
disputes which arise in the legal system and challenge one's
understanding of morality, modern society, and what is "right" or
"best," In re S.S. presented an easy issue for the Illinois Supreme
Court to decide. The court did not, however, relish this simple task.
The Illinois court unnecessarily created issues and difficulties, both
legal and emotional, when it applied state abandonment law to its
decision of domicile under ICWA in direct contravention of
congressional intent and United States Supreme Court precedent. In re
S.S. was not about what was best for S.S. and R.S. or with whom
they should live or what developmental influences must be legally
allowed or disallowed. Instead, this case was about respect of cultural
differences and the need to trust members of different cultures. The
Illinois Supreme Court was not willing to respect or trust the Fort Peck
tribe to control and wisely use its deserved autonomy. Presumably, in
the guise of trying to arrive at an outcome reflective of the "best
interests" of S.S. and R.S., the court applied a narrow definition of
those interests by refusing to acknowledge that the tribe might be better
capable of arriving at the children's best interests. The majority
decision in In re S.S. threatens the protective nature of ICWA and
promises to continue to impede national efforts to support tribal
autonomy.
VII.

POSTSCRIPT

Unfortunately for S.S., R.S., the rest of their family, and the Fort
Peck tribe, Iron Bear died in December 1995. 435 The implications of
the outcome of this case for the children involved were accordingly
altered. There is, obviously, no longer the chance that if Iron Bear
were a fit parent, a court could eventually place the children in her
care. While a decision to retain Iron Bear's parental rights would not
have required that result, it was at least a possibility or a feasible goal
for Iron Bear.436

The Tubridys withdrew their petition and Shelly S., the aunt with
whom the children currently reside, subsequently filed a petition to
adopt them. 437 The tribe continues its fight to obtain jurisdiction over
435. Tribal Attorneys to Continue Custody Battle Despite Mother's Death, West's
Legal News 446, Jan. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 258196.
436. Telephone Interview with Kathryn McGowan Bettcher, Esq., Prairie State Legal
Services (Nov. 1, 1996).
437. Id.
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the proceedings and continues to claim exclusive jurisdiction of the
case under ICWA.438 S.S. and R.S. also have relatives living on the
reservation who are interested in maintaining family ties with the
children. 439 The tribal court might have the flexibility to order
continued contact with biological family members even after an
adoption. 440 Consequently, if the tribal court had jurisdiction to decide
the case, it could resolve the issues in a more flexible way that
maintained contacts with both sets of extended family members
regardless of who became the adoptive parents.
If the tribal court obtains jurisdiction over the case, no guarantee
exists for the outcome. In fact, the outcome is less predictable than if
the Illinois court obtained jurisdiction. 44' It is possible that the tribal
court would find that it was in the best interests of the children and the
tribe that Shelly S., the children's aunt, adopt them. 442 This is
particularly likely because they have lived with her for four years.443
The tribal court, although working under the presumption that it is in
the child's best interest to be raised within Native American culture, 4
"carefully consider[s] those instances when a non-Indian couple may
be the most appropriate adoptive parents." 445
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438. Id. Presumably, the tribe would argue that the domicile of the children should be
determined as of the time the petitions were filed and, thus, would mirror the arguments
presented in this case.
439. Id.
440. Supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
441. The majority in In re S.S. is not so subtle when it advocates that the children
remain with the Tubridys. In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 937-43 (I11.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
442. See infra text accompanying notes 40-44.
443. Id. at 938.
444. See supra note 68.

445. Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 2 n.7 (citing NATIONAL INDIAN JUSTICE CENTER,
ch. 11, at 6. In two Navajo tribal court decisions, for
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example, the court found that the children involved in the cases would remain in nonIndian placements. Goldsmith, supra note 3,at 2 n.7 (citing Telephone Interview with
Craig Dorsay, Director, Native American Program, Oregon Legal Services (Feb. 20,
1990)).

